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INTRODUCTION
"The Transition"
Dying! In the streets of London, the last horsebus clattered towards extinction. The aeroplane,
that incongruous object, earthbound and wavering,
still called forth exclamations of rapture and
alarm. Country roads, with blind corners and precipitous inclines, took a last revenge upon the
loud invading automobile. There was talk of wild
young people in London, more wild and less witty
than you would ever guess from the novels of Saki;
of night clubs; of negroid dances. People gazed in
horror at the paintings of Gauguin, and listened
with a delighted alarm to the barbaric measures of
Stravinsky. The old order, the old bland world was
dying fast: ....
(George Dangerfield. The Strange Death of Liberal England)

Lord George Rankin Askwith , the tireless sage of the
Board of Trade, addressed a meeting of the Cavendish Club at
Bristol in November of 1913.

During his talk, Askwith observed

that throughout his recent travels as an arbitrator of industrial strikes, he had noticed

)

... a spirit abroad of unrest, of movement, a
spirit and a desire of improvement, of alteration .
We are in, perhaps, as quick an age of transition
as there has been for many generations past ... We
quicken day by day means of transport ... tramways,
railways, motors ... (The working-man has achieved)
political equality rand) he is far more anxious
to achieve a greater amount of economic equality ...
By newspapers, by magazines, by books, the workpeople are self-educating themselves far more than
they ever did a score of years ago ... That the present unrest will cease I do not believe for one
moment; it will increase, and probably increase

2

with greater force . 1
Within six months, England and the rest of Europe had plummeted
into World War I, the watershed of the modern world.

This war

dramatically altered the composition of European society .
The pervasive influence that the Great War had on Europe was
such that most people viewed the years leading up to 1914 as
"La Belle

I

Epo ~'.

Yet, the decade prece- ding the Great War

was also tumultuous.

Dangerfield and Askwith were both acutely

aware of a new order being formed before the war.

The years

after 1900 in England were filled with imperceptible and subtle
transitions; evolutionary changes; and the explosions of nearrevolution which rocked Britain especially in the years 1910-14 .
In the twenty-five years before the Great War, the life
of the British worker underwent a series of important changes
which gradually began to alter his view of the world.

The

startling growth of education, added leisure time, and the
improvement in technology (especially in communications) had
altered the worker's conception of the world, so that it no
longer was confined to local and private interests.

The

strikes of 1889 and the beginning of an independent Labour
movement in the early l '8.g,o-s attest to the labourer's new view
of himself and his place in society.
view was slow to grow.

This radically different

Thus, the strength of Labour politi-

cally and industrially did not become truly evident until
after 1906.

However, after the Boer War , the economic prosperity

1George Askwith, Industrial Problems and Disputes ( London :
John Murray, 1920), pp. 348-49 .

J
and stability that the wage-earner had known was superseded
by inflation and stationary wages.

Expectations and desires ,

both products of education were further heightened by the more
pronounced surface characteristics of the age.
England was a country of great wealth, and inequality had
long been ingrained within the fabric of society.

The growing

consciousness of the worker was accentuated by the late Victorian and Edwardian affinity for great shows of wealth .

The

late nineteenth century was one of the most ostentatious and
extravagant periods ever known.

All the worker had to do

was look around him to feel alienated from 'mainstream' England .
In 1891, Lloyd George, then an obscure Welsh M.P . grasped the
contradictions of English society in a speech in Bangor, S. Wales .
The most startling fact about our country is thisthat you have men who have accumulated untold wealth
living in gorgeous splendour in one street and a
horde of miserable, poverty-stricken human beings
huddled together in the most abject penury and squa lor in the adjoining courts. Incalc~ble wealth
and indescribable poverty dwell side by side. 2
At the same time, the nineteenth century's ideological
conception of the individual's place in society was changing .
The powerful individualism of John Stuart Mill had been joined
with a more ethical view of man.

The connection was forged

by the flowering of socialism, idealism, and the new evolutionary theories of society put forth by a more empirically
oriented scientific community.

The Victorian stigma of the

Poor Laws was slowly giving way to the realization that society
was also to blame for the individual ' s condition.

Society

2Martin Gilbert, Lloyd George (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall Inc., 1968), p. 29 .

4
had to take moral responsibility for its members for the good
of the organic whole.

Thus, a "New Liberalism" grew in intellec-

tual circles after 1900 which was best illustrated in the
writings of J . A. Hobson and L . T. Hobhouse .
This new intellectual Liberalism was translated into
policy after 1908 under the great Liberal government of Henry
Herbert Asquith , Lloyd George, and Winston Churchill .

A gra-

dual trend away from the more traditional Gladstonian issues
of the late nineteenth century had been taking place since
Harcourt ' s death duties of the 1890s.

Nonconformity, Home

Rule for Ireland, drink, and education were no longer the
rallying cries of the Liberal Party after 1906 .

Yet, it s hould

be noted that 1906 was unique as it brought together all of
these traditional issues in one mammoth electoral victory.
But this election was an anomaly and was mainly a reaction
against an utterly equivocal Tory Party of the early 1900s.
1906 should be viewed as the last gasp of the party of Gladstone .
In particular, after the budget of 1909 , the electoral focus
was on a omore economic plane as the necessity to appeal to
the people became evident.

Though the battle over the Lords

can be construed as an opportunity for revenge against Tory
emmasculation of Liberal legislation from 1906 to 1908, the
struggle was primarily over Lloyd George's "socialistic" budget .
1910 was the cardinal point for a new revolutionary spirit
in England.

George Dangerfield based his book on a series

of events which shook the roots of England from 1910 to 191 4.
Specifically, he focused on the industrial unrest , the suffra-

5
gette movement, and the Irish problem as symbolic of the end
of an age of respectability and elitist control.

In the Labour

movement, Dangerfield examined the revolutionary syndicalist
influence on the trade union movement.

Spontaneity and dis -

respect for the older union leaders were symptomatic of these
strikes .

The W.S.P.U. (Women's Social and Political Union) by

1910 had taken up arson as a tactic.

In Ireland, the Ulstermen

under Carson were preparing for a Civil War aided and abetted
by Bonar Law and the Cpnservative Party .

The common denomi-

nator in all of these crises was the incompetence and inability
of the Liberal Party to provide effective solutions to these
new and different rebellions.

Thus, Dangerfield concluded

that not only was Liberal England (Liberal in the sense of
Victorian England) in its death throes, but the Liberal Party ,
the symbol of nineteenth century England would be swept away
a l ong with its era. 3

This assertion began the avalanche of

literature addressed to the demise of the Liberal Party.
In 1906, the Liberal Party was victorious in the largest
landslide in English political history .

On the eve of World

War I, the Liberals were in control of 261 seats in the Commons.
By 1924, this total had fallen to 43; approximately the same
number that the Labour Party had held in 1910.

The Liberals

were never again to be more than a third party in British
politics .

This remarkable phenomenon has fascinated scholars

for some forty years .
3George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England "
(New York; Capricorn Books, 1961) .
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In general, two interpretations have taken hold as explanations for the political catastrophe that befell the party
of Lloyd George and Asquith.

The so - called "inevitablist"

school was inspired by Danger:'field' s The Stragge Death of
Liberal England which a rgued that 1910 to 1914 saw the end of
the Gilbertian age in England, socially, economically and
politically.

There was a spirit of rewolt and the Liberal

Party was not able to adjust to a new era in English history .
The party was for all intents and purposes dead by 1914 and
World War I served as Gabriel ' s horn.
since

Stran~

As the years have passed

Death, a more sophisticated "inevitablist" argu -

ment has evolved, best represented by Ross McKibbin's The Evolution of !he Labour

He argues that working class

Part~.

consciousness was growing before the war.

McKibbin then examines

the internal evolution of the structure of the Labour Party
in the years 1910 to 1924.

From these two points , he goes

on to extrapolate from 1914 to the franchise bill of 1918,
claiming the inevitability of the victory of Labour.

In recent

years the "inevitablist" position has been strongly discredited .
The so-called "accidentalists" have been in the vanguard
of recent years in the debate.

The major spokesmen for this

interpretation are P.F. Clarke and Trevor Wilson .

These his -

torians look to World War I as the true cause of the Liberal ' s
death.

Clarke in particular focuses on the elections and

by-elections of 1910 to 1914.
)

He shows persuasively that the

Liberal Party's support was not eroding.
had shed their middle-class ideology .

In fact, the Liberals

A "New Liberalism " had

7

evolved during this period and the Liberals were very active
in the area o£ social re£orm.

In Lancashire and the New

Liberalism, Clarke argues that the Liberals had not only
adapted ideologically to new pressures, but had indeed gained
a new working class constituency in the Northwest.
as i£ the party was healthier than ever.

It seemed

But then World War

I intervened, splitting the party and thus killing it.
What is the purpose o£ writing a paper on a question
which many scholars have considered solved?

This topic's most

recent investigators have only had to elaborate on its substance and

·i.,)

neaten its structure .

The purpose o£ this paper

is to reopen this Pandora ' s Box o£ historians' nightmares .
The truth o£ history does not lie in the insipid structure o£
election results which at best reveal the sur£ace; yet never
reach the depths o£ the essence.
history is not neat.

This paper proposes that

It is a constant stream o£ contradic-

tions especially in as transitional a period as 1910 to 1914.
A period o£ transition by de£inition entails the interac tion o£ the old and new.

Because there are new issues being

discussed does not mean the old ones are unimportant and
ignored.

At times the old will £ight the new.

At other times

the old will in£luence the new in such a way as to form a
quali£ied new £orce.

All of these combinations pervaded the

period 1910 to 1914.
The years 1910 to 1914 have been isolated be£ore in
Danger£ield's impressionistic interpretation.

Yet, this semi -

nal work only scratches the sur£ace of a period teeming with

8

changes.

Thus , the primary rationale for scrutinizing the

period 1910 to 1914 is that it saw the cUlmination of many
dramatic and rapid changes that had been brewing for over a
decade.

Our inquiry is the effect that this transition had

on politics with an emphasis on the Liberal-Labour controversy .
However, the lever used to gain

a~ to

is not the typical angle of entry .

this political system

It is crucial to understand

that politics does not operate in a vacuum, but in a given
social context.

To truly understand the dynamics of a political

situation, it is first necessary to examine all facets of
the "political system".

Thus, this paper takes a bottom-up

view of antebellum England.
The first chapter deals with the underlying trends of
the period.

At first the material conditions of the first

decade of the twentieth century will be assessed.
the economic condition of the people?

What was

How was this position

colored by the levels of relative deprivation, education, and
leisure time that existed in Edwardian England?

Once these

basic areas have been examined, chapter one goes on to trace
the development known as the "New Unionism" which began taking
root after 1889 and really found its place after 1910.

What

was the nature of this unionism and what made it different from
its predecessor?

We will briefly look at the disputes of

the period and their importance to a growing workers' consciousness.

This topic of consciousness-will then be viewed within

the framework of the earlier part of this chapter.

The final

section will then make the bridge to politics as it briefly

9
examines the political ramifications of the "New Unionism".
Chapter two concentrates on the parliamentary Labour
Party.

In tracing the early development of Labour, emphasis

will be placed on the multitude of constraints and liabilities
that the party encountered from 1900 to 1914.

Areas covered

will include internal weaknesses , the relationship with trade
unions, and external constraints ( i.e. the Liberal Party,
the constraints of the political system, etc.) .

The second

part of the chapter will examine the growth of the Labour
Party from 1910 to 1914.

Not only will the evolution of the

structure,-:-61' the party be assessed but the general political
picture from the perspective of Labour a s of 1914 will be
examined.
The last chapter will scrutini ze the actual position of
the Liberal Party in the years 1910 to 1914 with an emphasis
on the oft-overlooked question of municipal elections.

Some

may ask after the author ' s earlier attempts at discrediting
purely empirical studies why he ends up doing the same.
reason is to show how misleading electoral study can be .

The
For

at the national level , the Liberals will be seen to be strong
while Labour appears inept and at bay.
reveal quite a different picture.

Municipal results

After this section, a

conclusion will attempt to draw this

eclectb~

approach into

a sfungle cohesive statement of ililtent.
It is important to include a warning for the reader .
There has been an immense amount of material written on this
topic and it is impossible to ignore this vast corpus of scho -
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larship in any examination o£ the area in question.

Thus ,

when possible, many o£ the traditional questions and problems
o£ the historiography will be addressed directly.

In parti-

cular, P.F. Clarke's work will be reacted to.
This paper has purposely avoided discussing the £oreign
matters o£ the day.

There is no doubt that these a££airs

were on peoples ' minds .

Yet, it is di££icult to say what i£

any e££ect they had on the political system.

The "German

Problem" can o£ course be considered as another burden on
the Liberal government.

Along with the constitutional crises

of the day, it constrained the actions o£ all political parties .
Another caution need be given and that is to beware the
line and tone that this interpretation takes.

Without looking

at the body o£ this paper, one might surmise that a new "inevi tablist" argument is being put £orth which has the Labour
Party replacing the Liberals by 1914.
o£ this essay.

This is not the thrust

The paper will be worded cautiously in order

to prevent such an argument £rom COIning £orth.

The purpose

of the £irst three chapters is not to give easy answers to
several di££icult questions.

The growth o£ trade unionism

£rom 1910 to 1914 does not necessarily connote a proportional
growth £inancially and spiritually in the Labour Party.

Nor

does the fracturing o£ Lib-Labism after 1910 mean that Ramsay
MacDonald was not going to try and renegotiate an electoral
pact with the Liberals for a possible 1915 General Election.
Because Liberalism was weakening locally in areas where it
had been strong for many years does no t reveal an irreversible
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trend.

Thus, it must be said that the true aim of this paper

is not to provide answers, but to stimulate new questions.
A final definitive solution to the controversy over the Liberal
Party will not be found within these pages.

For a resolution .

one will have to take the advice of the Right Honourable H.H.
Asquith and simply "wait and see " .
eternity .

.)

The wait might last to

CHAPTER I
1886-1914:

THE UPHEAVAL

In 1910-a year of record trade-wages remained practically stationary. The cost of lyving increases,
and the working people's desires rightly grow. But
with stationary wages, the real condition of the
workers is one of diminishing power to satisfy desires. This is one of the causes of the unrest in
the Labour world. With the spread of education,
with the display of wealth and luxury by the rich
it is certain that the workers will not be content •.
If employers and politicians are so unwise as to ignore the demands of Labour, then what might be done
by safe constitutional methods will, by great suffering and loss, be accomplished by industrial strife,
and through social anarchy.
(Philip Viscount Snowden)

The most salient feature of British politics during the
period 1886 to 1914 was the stunning rise to power of the
working class.

Before this time (1906 in particular), the

proletariat had been only one (though an important one) of
many interest groups in British politics.

Though potentially

preponderant in number, the British worker had been strangely
absent from the political scene.

Yet, after 1886 1 , he suddenly

11886 is a traditional historical demarcation in British
history. The Liberal Party split over Irish Home Rule and it
was from about this date that working class movements began to
enjoy more than parochial popularity.
12

13
awakened from a long and relatively tranquil slumber .

Pre-

viously, the wage-earner had made occasional forays into the
political arena, only to be mollified and returned to his
proper place in society.

But after 1886, he entered the poli-

tical forum in such a way as to decisively and permanently
alter the entire framework of the British electoral system.
It is the purpose of this chapter to describe the sometimes
subtle and sometimes cataclysmic process by which the working
class established itself as the single most important force
in British politics .
The "Quiet" Revolution
While on the campaign trail during the General Election
of 1906, Lloyd George exclaimed:
I believe there is a new order coming from the
people of this country. It is a quiet, but certain revolution as revolutions come in a constitutional country.2
Ll oyd

George \~

observation was quite correct .

Indeed, there

had been a quiet revolution occurring within the working class
since 1886 .

The causes of this transformation were concisely

stated in the epigraph to this chapter.

This section of the

chapter will seek to expand on Snowden ' s observations and
provide documentation that will explain exactly why this
revolution occurred.
In 1899, Seebohm Rowntree in his famous study of York ,
wrote that forty per cent of all urban wage-earners and their
2Colin Cross, The Liberals in Power (London:
Rackliff with Pall Mall Press, 1903), p. 20.

Barrie and
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families were living in poverty .

Poverty was defined as the

inability to buy "the minimum of food, clothing, and shelter
needful for maintenance of merely physical health.")

Rowntree

went on to spell out what "merely phY's ical efficiency" (the
subsistence level) was.
A family living upon the scale allowed for in this
estimate must never spend a penny on· railway fare
or omnibus. They must never go into the country
unless they walk. They must never purchase a half penny newspaper or spend a penny to buy a ticket
for a popular concert. They must write no letters
to absent children, for they cannot afford to pay
the postage. They must never contribute anything
to their church or chapel, or give any help to a
neighbor which costs them money. They cannot save,
nor can they join sick club or Trade Union, because
they cannot pay the necessary subscriptions. The
children must have no pocket money for dolls, marbles, or sweets. The father must smoke no tobacco,
a nd must drink no beer. The mother must never buy
any pretty clothes for herself or for her children. -.
Should a child fall ill, it must be attended by the
parish doctor; should it die, it must be buried by
the parish. Finally, the wage-earner ~ust never be
absent from his work for a single day.4
Rowntree's findings were not peculiar to York .

Studies con-

ducted by Charles Booth in London (1887-92) and Bowley and
Burnett-Hurst in Northampton, Warrington, Stanley, and Reading
(1912 and 1913) all closely agreed with Rowntree's pathetic
conclusions. 5

Poverty had long been ingrained within the

fabric of British life.

Yet , the surveys conducted by Rown-

tree and Booth in particular revealed for the first time in
3E.H. Phelps Brown, The Growth of British Industrial
Relations ( London: MacMi~lan & Co. Ltd., 1959), p. 25.
4Ibid . ,
5Ibid .

I,
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print what had been virtually ignored for hundreds of years .
The realization by intellectuals of the depths of despair that
the worker endured helped spur on an ideological revolution
leading to both a "New Liberalism" and the growth of socialism .
These developments will not be scrutinized here.
our interest will focus on the worker.

Instead,

If conditions of squa -

lor had existed for many years, why was it that it was only
in the late-Victorian period that the worker finally became
aware of his predicament?
Historically, English wage-earners had become aroused
at certain times to correct specific wrongs .

Certainly the

heroic struggles of such groups as the Diggers, the Luddites,
and the Chartists should not be overlooked.

Yet, the common

man of the late 1800s underwent a different process than his
predecessors, thanks to the remarkable growth in education.
In 1870, an Act was passed which set up the School Boards
to fill gaps between voluntary schools .

Within six years , a

million and a half new pupils were offered slots in school .
Along with this numerical growth was the general improvement
of teaching quality as the amount of teachers per student
dramatically increased throughout the period.

The Balfour

Act of 1902 was directed at developing secondary education .
J

Responsibility for these sehools was placed squarely on the
shoulders of the countyy councils and by 1907, the grant-aided
secondary schools were required to give not less than a quarter
of'their spots to free, place scholars from elementary schools .
.

The effect of the 1870 Act on elementary schools and the 1902
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Act on secondary schools is most viviliily shown in the f'ollowing
f'igures .
Estimated proportion of' the population of' London
within the ages 25-55 who at the date shown had
passed through an ef'f'icient school. 6
~

Year
1891
1901
1911

2)
52
78

These statistics are probably accurate f'or all of' England . 7
From 1891 to 1911, the number of' people who had completed
basic work in reading, writing, and arithmetic quantum-leaped
an astounding 55%!
be overstated.

The importance of' this phenomenon cannot

More than any other development of' this period,

the growth in education and thus literacy marked the lateVictorian worker of'f' f'rom any of' his predecessors.

Bef'ore

to f'irst examine several other critical developments and characteristics of' this period.
The second major inf'luence on the worker was the general
reduction in the work week.

A brief' examination of' f'our of'

the major industries will reveal a general trend towards a
new and unheard of' luxury f'or the working class; leisure time.
In 1874, there V;~ general reduction of' hours worked in the
~f'extile

industry f'rom sixty to f'if'ty-six and a half'.

another hour had been eliminated f'rom the work week.
6Brown, p. 45.
7Ibid .

By 1902 ,
Similarly,
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the Building industry saw a reduction in 1860 from sixty to
fifty-six and a half hours worked a week.

Four more hours had

been removed from the work schedule by 1873 and in 1893, the
work week stood at an even fifty hours.

The Engineering trade

received a reduction of six hours in 1871 from sixty to fiftyfour · hours worked per week.

Finally, in the Coal industry,

the miners were granted the eight hour day in 1909 by an Act
of Parliament. 8

Thus, by 1909, the miserable drudgery of

industrial labour had been somewhat eased by a general reduction in the work week from about sixty hours to anywhere from
forty-eight to fifty-five.

The question that naturally arises

is what the worker would do with this new and totally alien
phenomenon of leisure time?
Yet another interesting feature of late-Victorian England
was the cUlmination of several trends which all overlapped
at the same time.

In the areas of technology, education,

ideology, and social habits (some of these were results of
each other), certain developments which had been brewing for
years all reached fruition at the same time and helped cause
this "quiet" revolution.

It was just during this period that

many advances in technology were being felt by the common
worker for the first time.

The electric motor in particular

began to .make its presence felt in the factory .

Electricity

brought together many scattered small workrooms under one
roof.

This wa;sa major reason for a 50% increase in the number

of factories from 1895 to 1913.

In addition , between 1870 and

8A.L. Bowley, Wages and Income in the United Kingdom Since
1860 (Cambridge: C.D.P., 1937), pp . 25-26 .
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1914, the amount of equipment per man doubled . 9

Specializa-

tion in the different stages of making a product had been
noted years before by Adam Smith.

Yet, this mechanization

and increasing alienation of the worker from the total product
was intensifying throughout this period of constant innovation .
The dehumanization caused by the modern f actory was more and
more evident during these years.

The vivid descriptions by

Marx in Das Kapital or the tragi-comic vision of a Charlie
Chaplin in "Modern Times" are exemplary and poignant illus trations of the utter degradation that the worker in a modern
industrial state suffered, as he became but a cog in a vast
network of machinery.

As George Askwith, the foremost arbi -

trator of the Board of Trade I1>u t it:

"The workmen become

numbers, grouped on processes, driven into pigeon-holes . .. ". 10
One of the by-products of the growth of technology was
the development in communication.

In particular, newspapers

were more easily accessible than ever before.

The tremendous

outpouring of propaganda by the newly imported Syndicalist
movement and revamped socialist movements found its way into
the workers ' hands for the first time.

Mann's The Syndicalist ,

The Miner's Next Step, Blatchford's Clarion, Champion's Labour
Elector, Keir Hardie's Labour Leader, the Workman's Times,
the Cotton Factory Times, the Yorkshire Factory Times, the
S.D.F. 's periodical, Justice , Money ' s Riches and Poverty, not
9Brown, p. 90.
1 0Askwith, p. 16.
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to mention Fabian tracts and Rowntree ' s and Booth's surveys
all appeared in the years 1886 to 1900 .

Between 1900 and 1910,

benefactions of Andrew Carnegie began, and led to the opening
of some 900 municipal libraries.

The worker was now not only

able to read, but had the time and opportunity to do it .

For

the first time, the workingman was able to step back from his
life and realiliy look at it.
revolution.

Askwith understood this quiet

He noted thatl

Education and self-education had been going on
more and more rapidly for years before. More
and more young people were being turned out into
the world with better knowledge of books and wider
aspirations than their grandfathers had, but with
no equal speed had a right to start or opportunities for advancement or any s~ stem giving them a
return for their efforts been opened up. Can anyone be surprised that the various forms of propaganda find adherents?ll
Perhaps the most ironic trend of the era which colored
this new worker's perception
around him.

was the nature of the society

For one of the major aids in this process of a

growing consciousness was the realization of the vast physical difference between himself and late-Victorian and Edwardian
society.

Despite the failure of the Boer War, England was at

the apex of its colonial power .

The country had never been

more prosperous and inequality in the sharing of this wealth
could be seen with the naked eye.
was obvious.

The difference in dress

It is not an overstatement to say that most

workers lived in ghettos.

Yet, the extremity of this inequality

was most evidenced by the actions of the rich.
11Askwith, p. 296 .

"Victorian
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reticence in the display of wealth had g iven way to conspi cuous expenditure in restaurants, hotels and above all, in
the country houses of the rich.,,12
was the King himself, Edward VII .
opulence.

The symbol of gaudiness
Edward was the picture of

In fact:

Edwardian society modelled itself to suit the
King's personal demands. Everything was larger
than lifesize. There was an avalanche of balls and
dinners and country house parties. More money was
spent on clothes, more food was consumed, more
horses were raced, more infidelities were committed,
more birds were shot, more yachts were commissioned,
more late hours were kept, than ever before. It
was, in short, the most ostentatious and extravagant decade that England had ever known. 1 3
If this quotation conveys an image of hedonism, it has served
its purpose well.

Though it is difficult to prove these

generalizations, there is little doubt that people of the
time viewed the rich in this manner.

An examination of C.F.G .

Masterman's (a minister in Asquith's cabinet) The Condition
of England will confirm this description of the rich.
While it is difficult to grapple with as ambiguous a
concept as consciousness, the developments traced in the previous pages must necessarily lead one to the co'nclusion that
a new awareness would grow on the part of the worker.

The

workingman who lived during the twenty-five years before World
War I underwent a radical transformation in outlook.

New

aspirations were growing as the wage-earner became better
educated.
J

Yet these desires were bound to be frustrated.

The

l~Cross, p. 137.

13James Laver, Edwardian Promenade (London,
ton, 1958), p. 1 7 .

Edward HUl -
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worker began to realize that he was in some sense socially
different and that this was unjust.

The opulence of the period

confirmed the fact that his interests, desires , and life styles
were peculiarly his own.

Such outbursts as the strikes of

1889 , the formation of the Social Democratic Federation and
the Independent Labour Party were the first signs of this
new perception.
1910 to 1914.

However, the period this paper addresses i is
For this reason it is important to examine

how this new consciousness became s visible after 1900.

Thus ,

this new consciousness must be looked at against the background
of the actual economic conditions of the period.
The Economy and the People *
From 1910 to 1914, England underwent the most tumultuous
period of internal industrial F-ebellion it had ever known.
The number of strikes and work days lost in these years was
staggering .

There had been periods of unrest before; but

never to the extent or degree of the period in question.

What

made the strike wave of 1910-14 different from the one in 1889
or any other period of social upheaval in British history?
The first part of this chapter developed several reasons
and causes for the rise of a new worker.

Most of this argu-

ment dealt with broad trends and influences.

With this in

mind, it is important to deal with some of the constraints on
*This section is but an excerpt from a much larger and
more detailed economic analysis found in Appendix A. It is
strongly emphasized that those interested in termonology and
methodology consult the Appendix before reading this section .
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this new spirit be£ore going on to the economic £igures.

Per-

haps the most important was the historic nature o£ the British
worker and in particular, his view towards his country.

England

had historically been the symbol of how the "system" could
adapt to changes in the make-up of society.

Since 1688,

England had been a model of government by consent.

There

was a real pride in the unwritten constitution and in parliament.

While the rest of Europe was undergoing the upheavals

o£ the post-Napoleonic period and revolutions of 1848, the
Parliament o£ England was passing the great Re£orm Bill of
1832.
empire .

The British worker was proud of his country and the
Radical Englishmen were more influenced by the wri -

tings o£ John Stuart Mill than by those of Karl Marx .14

It

is little wonder that such groups as the S.D.F. and other
more utopian Marxist groups found £ew adherents in Britain . 15
Instead, the new class consciousness engendered by the growth
in education, reduction in the work week, and advances in
technology must be understood against the background of a
worker who was £iercely patriotic and adamantly opposed to
revolution.

Thus, this consciousness was focused on very

specific and realistic demands.

An examination of revolu-

tionary Syndicalism or Marxism will not reveal the true causes
of the unrest of this era. 16
14Michael Freeden, The New Liberali,sm ( Oxford:
Press ,1978), pp. 2)-27· -

Clarendon

15Althoughthe S.D.F. exercised little national power,
it was quite influential in London.
16S ee E . J. Hobsbawm, Labouring Men (London:
and Nicolson, 1964), chapters 12, 15, and 1 6 .

Weiden£eld

2J
Be£ore going on to discuss the economic conditions o£
England, it is important to clari£y the intent o£ this section .
A period o£ transition contains both aspects o£ the old and
new.

The economic trends about to be analyzed are not all

new phenomena to the British scene.

What makes them important

is how they combined with some o£ the newer trends to heighten
the sensitivity o£ the working class to its own condition .
Thus, some o£ the traditional causes o£ worker unrest are as
operative in the period 1910 to 1914 as they were at earlier
timesin British history (e.g ., high employment and stagnant
wages) .
The most important aspect o£ the economic figures o£
the £irst decade o£ the twentieth century to consider is how
they compared with those numbers o£ the years immediately
previous.

For the £irst time in some £i£ty years, nominal

wages were lagging behind prices.

To bring this phenomenon

into perspective it is necessary to examine three measurements .
The course o£ the nominal wage, the real wage, and the cost
o£ living will there£ore be scrutinized .

Q£ course , these

three measurements are dependent upon one another.

T

But it

is most convenient and help£ul to examine them individually.
From 1900 to 1910, the nominal wage (what the worker took
home each week) hovered around the same average £igure.

In

£act, it took ten years £or the nominal wage to stabilize at
the level it had reached in 1900, and then make steady improveJ

ment.
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Table 1
1880=1 00

Year..;.Wage
1900-130
1901-128
1902-126
1903-12.5
1904-123
190.5-126
1906-133

Year;;..Wage
1907-133
1908 -130
1909-129
1910-130
1911-131
1912-13.5
1913-137
1914-138

SOURCEIA.L. Bowley, Wages and Income Since 1880, p.

6.

The figures from 1910 to 1914 showed a rise of eight points.
The period has been generally characterized as one of wage
stagnation .

The Board of Trade described the period as one

of a " slight upward movement in wages ... (which) did not become
at anytime marked. ,,17

In fact, the largest jump between 1911

and 1912 was due almost solely to the Miners Minimum Wage Act
of 1912.
The nominal wage alone only reveals that wages were not
improving very much.

It is even more revealing when this

wage is compared with the cost of living (the cost of food ,
rent, clothing, fuel, etc.).

For this figure gives the best

insight into the workingman ' s economic condition .

Basically,

the cost of living can be tabulated by averaging the course
of a budget of expenditure from year to year.

By dividing

the nominal wage by this figure, one will find the real wage .
The real wage reveals what the buying power of the worker
really was and is thus the best measurement available for
figuring out the actual eyonomic condition of the wage-earner .
17Board of Trade Labbur Gazette ( January , 191 1), p . 3 .
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Table 2
Nominal N
94
93
91
91
89
89
91
96
94
94
94
95
98
99
(100)

Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
(1914 )

Cost of Living
91
90
90
91
92
92
93
95
93
94
96
97
100
102
(100)

Real Wage
103
102
101
99
97
97
98
101
101
100
98
97
97
97
(100)=W.W. I

SOURCE:A.L. Bowley, p. 30.
The real wage was very stationary throughout the period, and
the 1913 figure was actually six points less than in 1900.
Pe-r haps even more illuminating is the fact that the retail
price of food jumped 15% between 1900 and 1913 as compared to
a rise in wages of 8%.18
Another important statistic to examine is the unemploy ment figure.

The greatest amount of union recruitment had
always occurred during periods of high employment. 19 1910
to 1914 was no exception mo this rule.
Table .1

Year
1907
1908
1909

~

Unemployed
3·7
7·8
7·7

Union Membership iOOo's)
2,513
2,485
2,477

18Board of Trade Labour Gazette (January, 1915), p. 4.
19Henry Pelling, . Popular Politics and Society in Late
Victorian Britain (London: MacMillan and Co., 1968J, p. 149.
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Table l-Continued
~

Year
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914

Unemployed
4.7
3·0
3·2
2.1
3·3

Union Membership (OOO's)
2,565
3,139
3,416
4,135
4,145

SOURCE:Henry Pelling,Popular Politics, p. 149.
1910 to 1914 saw great union activity during a period of high
employment.

This was due to a worker who was more confident

about his future and felt he could risk joining a union.

The

chance of scab labourers replacing union men was less during
a period of high employment.

Workers had greater leverage

during periods when industry needed them.

The other two t most

recent periods of union and strike activity came in 1888-91
and 1896-1901 which were also periods of high employment ( though
the latter period of activity was muted by patriotic fervor
for the Boer War).

A comparison with earlier numbers is also

helpful in putting the real wage into perspective.

For in

the fifteen years before 1900, nominal wages had been consistently rising at a faster rate than the cost of living.
One f fu nal question to ask of the economic statistics is
what was the wage-earner's share in the total GNP?

For over

forty years, the wage-earner who made up approximately 75-80%
of the population was consistently earning about 40% of the

GNP.
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Table 4

Years
1870-4
1875-9
1880-4
188.5-9
1890-4
1895-9
1900-4
1905-9
1910-13

Wages as
Percentage o£ GNP
40.7
41.5
40.0

Wage-earners as
% of' occupied
"Qopulation

40.1

41·9
40.7
40·3
38.0
37 · 3

SOURCE: Cambridge Economic History of' Europe, Vol. 7, part. 1, p . 1 68 .
This table shows a declining percentage o£ the work£orce earning a consistent percentage o£ the GNP.

Thus, it would seem

that the wage-earner was actually improving his position.
this is misleading.

But

These are aggregative £igures which ob-

scure certain distributive anomalies (e.g. skilled and whitecollar occupations were improving their position and they are
c l assed as wage-earners ) within the wage sector.

The more

obvious £act is that three-quarters o£ the population was
earning only £orty per cent o£ the GNP (i.e. twenty-£ive per
cent o£ the population earns sixty per cent o£ the GNP).
Thus, there was no signi£icant improvement in the wage-earner ' s
lot.

Inequality was as pervasive during this period o£ unparalleled national prosperity as at any other time. 20
The most important in£luence on the £igures examined so
£ar was the Coal Industry.

Like Table 4, the aggregate wage

. 20From 1900 to 1913, the net national income o£ the Uni ted Kingdom jumped by over .500 mill~on pounds or 30%. Indus trial production increased by 16 . .5%. S·ee David Butler and
Jennie Freeman, British Political Facts: 1200-1960 (New York:
St . Martin ' s Press Inc., 1963), p. 221.
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table also obscures certain distributive anomalies.

The Coal

Industry illustrates such an anomaly .
Table .2
Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907

Coal Nominal Wages
163
153
142
138
134
132
136
1.57

SOURCE:

Year
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914

Coal Nominal Wages
152
145
146
144
152
163
160

Bowley, p. 8.

The tragic story o£ the miners is eloquently told in these
figures .

It took £ourteen years £or wages to regain the level

reached in 1900, and this was only accomplished by the Minimum
Wage Act o£ 1912.

A quick comparison with Table 1 will show

the correlation between the £luctuations in the miner's wage
and the aggregate wage.
other industries.

Appendix A provides the £igures o£

These numbers were remarkably stagnant

throughout the period revealing how signi£icant the Coal Industry's £igures were .

It is critical to note that the most

important catalysts in the growth of both union membership
and the increase in trade disputes during the years 1910 to
1914 were the miners, railwaymen, and unskilled workers (especially transport workers).
documented.

The miners' plight has been

The railway and transport £igures

in the aggregate nominal wage table.
)

~

not included

Yet, it is £airly well

known that in both ot these industries, wages and work condi tions were abominable. 21
21See either Danger£ield or Askwith.
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This section ' s purpose has been to establish that the
period from 1900 to 1914 was at best, one of stagnation for
the worker. 22

Nominai wages struggled throughout the entire

period to regain the levels of 1900.

Meanwhile, prices were

consistently rising faster than wages.

That these phenomena

were felt by the worker is apparent from almost all of the
literature of the period. 23

Consi'dered in the framework es-

tablished earlier of greater education, more leisure time,
and innovations in technology, a causal relationship can be
seen for the subsequent growth of trade unionism and the
Labour Party.

In particular, the plight of the worker in the

three major industries involved in the unrest of 1910 to 1914
was most severe.

All of these men (miners, railwaymen, and

transport workers) were part of industries that were integrally
connected with the British economy.

Their efforts to enhance

their positions were directly felt by the entire country and
even further added to the growing class consciousness of the
period.
How did all of these underlying trends become visible
in the period under scrutiny?

The rest of this chapter will

attempt to answer this question.
unionism will be traced.

The peculiar growth of trade

In particular, an emphasis will be

placed on how unionism differed from the previous types of
unionism, the nature of the disputes from 1910 to 1914, and
22 J . H. Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, 3
vols. (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1938), 3:474.
23An examination of LRC and TUe Annual Reports is helpful
in illustrating this perception.
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the connection between trade unionism and politics.

Thus ,

the groundwork has been laid £or an understanding o£ the re markable rise :to power o£ the worker.

He was now un£ettered

by the crippling disability o£ illiteracy.
turned his world upside down.

Technology had

He worked hard and yet seemed

to get little return £or his herculean e££orts.
was a "new spirit abroad o£ unrest".

Yet, there

The only question that

remained was how much longer the worker would remain quietly
£rustrated.

Undoubtedly he was not going to wait £orever .

The timing and tactics used to accomplish his ends would rock
the very £oundations o£ British li£e.
Consolidation, Amalgamation, and Federation
Be£ore 1889, the overriding characteristic o£ British
trade unionism was sectionalism.
the cra£t union.

The most common unit was

Communication with other cra£ts was rare

and separatism was the watchword.

Operatives who were not

apprenticed, yet had acquired a skill in mills or the mine
also £ormed separate unions early in the nineteenth century.24
However, the unskilled labourer was still as yet unorganized.
This entire situation changed with the year 1889.

There

seemed to be a new spirit in this year as men such as John
Burns and Tom Mann led the way in the £ormation o£ unions in
the transport industry, municipal employment, and other unskilled labour.
type o£ union.

All o£ these kinds o£ labour joined a new
The General Union was £ounded which cut across

24H.A. Clegg, Alan Fox, and A.F. Thompson, Hi:s.tory o£
British Trade Unionism Since 1882., 2 vols. (Ox£ord: Clarendon
Press, 1964}, 1:12~.
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occupational and industrial lines .

This new type o£ union

was motivated by a £eelingo:fjc"!tasssolidari ty.

The spectacular

strikes o£ 1889, best typi£ied by the London Dockers all pointed
to the end o£ sectionalism and the beginning o£ a "New Unionism".25
Yet, the 1890s saw a period o£ retrenchment by employers .
The new unions o£ 1889, while still in existence, exerted
little or no power and their imluence was £elt only through
sporadic stoppages during the decade.

Indeed, the 1890s were

years o£ reaction and the Boer War helped make the "New Unionism "
an umu£illed promise .

The impetus £or another and more per-

manent growth in union membership came in 1901 £rom the courts
in the £amous Ta££ Vale Judgement.

The House o£ Lords ruled

that trade unions could be held responsible £or monetary losses
incurred during a strike.
a political struggle.

Ta££ Vale showed the necessity o£

Not only did this crippling decision

reinvigorate trade unionism, but it also immeasurably aided
the young and struggling Labour Representative Committee.
ASter 1889, and especially a£ter Ta££ Vale, the most
important development in industrial relations was the general
consolidation o£ unionism.

It is constructive to trace the
most important types o£ centralization that occurred. 26 For
25By 1900, cra£t, operative, and the "new" unions aecounted
£or more than 75% o£ all union membership . The rural areas
and smaller industries such as £ishing and £arming were as
yet very unorganized and sectional. But £our-£i£ths o£ the
population lived in urban areas. There£ore, this discussion
is only pertinent to the urban worker who was by far the most
preponderant.
26This section is based on Sidney and Beatrice Webb ' s,
History o£ British Trade Unionism (New York: Longmans, Greend
and Co., 1920).
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there is no doubt that it was a direct product of a gro wing
class consciousness.
The most powerful union of the nineteenth century was
that of the Cotton Operatives.

Despite this sfength, the

union had been splintered into highly autonomous bodies of
spinners , weavers, reelers, carders, blowers, etc.

But by

the turn of the century , these groups became united in first
a federal body for each sector, and then a general body of
the Textile Factory Worker's Association .
The Building trades also saw a similar type of centralization grow after 1890 with such groups as the Amalgamated
Society of Operative House and Ship Painters and Decorators
forming.

Tom Mann, John Burns, and George Barnes all came

from the Amalgamated Society of Engineers.

Other metal trades ,

and in particular the Boilermakers, and Shipwrights were
undergoing constant consolidation absorbing local associations throughout this period.
The most important development of 1889 was the formation
of the General Workers Union.
'90s.

This union floundered in the

But from 1910 to 1913 , it grew from 5000 to 91,000

members.

The most important development within the union

was in the transport sector under the leadership of Mann.
S eamen,

ij ightermen, t{·ock and Wharf workers, coal porters , and

carmen all joined together to form the National Transport
Workers Federation in November of 1910.

The NTWF was one of

the major contributors to the unrest of 1911 to 1914.
importance of this group was

se~n

The

in its partial success in
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engendering sympathetic strikes from other industries it was
connected to .

The NTWF almost succeeded in bringing commer-

cial life to a halt in the summer of 1911.
The largest numerical force in trade unionism during
this period was the mining industry.

In 1888, the Miners

Federation of Great Britain formed out of six smaller unions .
Wi t h the addition of the Northumberland and Durham miners in
1908 , the MFGB reached the figure of 600,000 in membership.
The national strike of 1912 paralyzed England and forced
through the Minimum Wage Act.

By this .time, Robert Smillie

of the ILP had become president of the MFGB.

The affiliation

of the MFGB to the Labour Party was a crucial step in the
history of the workers ' movement as Lib-Labism in the coal fields began to wane.
The last major area of consolidation was in the Railway
industry.

In the mid-1890s, railway unions were scattered.

But with the reaction of the period against unionism, the
"All Grades Movement" (cutting across all railway-type occu pations)'began and doubled union membership by 1897 .

The

Railway industry was perhaps the most economically depressed
trade at the opening of the twentieth century.

This led to

a very serious strike in 1907 which was only settled by the
Conciliation Board scheme proposed by Lloyd George.

This

proved unsatisfactory and in 1913, three of the five major
unions (General Workers, Pointsmen, and Signalmen ) formed
the National Union of Railwaymen .
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Thus, by 1914, this process of consolidation had become
the overwhelming trend in trade unionism.

By 1914, five -

sixths of all trade union membership was contained in only
100 unions.

The Trades Union Congress which had been but a

nominal organ for some thirty years after its founding in the
mid-1860s, was now the major voice of the union world, pro viding both money and food for strikers and indispensable
financial support for the Labour Party.

The cUlmination of

all of these trends came on April 23, 1914 when the NUR, MFGB,
and NTWF formed the Triple Alliance.

The Alliance was to be

the mechanism by which each of these unions could come to
each others aid while one of them was striking.

The Triple

Alliance was potentially the tool that could be used to achieve
the revolutionary Syndicalist dream of the General Strike.
Thus, the craft unionism that dominated England before 1889
had been all but destroyed by the outbreak of World War I.
The class consciousness which had been forged by a combina tion of frustration and aspiration began to exercise its new
found strength under the auspices of the trade union movement .
The "Unquiet" Revolution:

1910-14

Table 6
Total
Union Membership
Year
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912

(OOO's)

_,,,,,_,'?,,513
2,485
2,477
2,565
3,139
3,416

Total no. of
working days
No. of stoppages lost by stop beginninginyear pages' COOO' s)
585
2,150
389
10,790
422
2,690
521
9,870
872
10,160
834
40,890

35
Table 6-'Continued
Total
Union Membership
(OOO's)
.. 4,135
4,145

Year
1913
1914

No. of stoppages beginnira in year
__ 1,459
972

Total no . of
working days
lost by stoppages ~OOO's)
9, 00
9,880

SOURCE: Pelling,p. 149.
In the introduction to BBn Tillett ' s History of the Trans ~ort

Worker's Strike of 1911, Harry Quelch tried to describe

the difference between the Dockers strikes of 1889 and 1911 .
.. . there seemed to be a greater spontaneity, a
broader conception of the ultimate objectives of
the working-class struggle . .. and a stronger feeling of solidarity and of al l that solidarity implies than ever before. 2 7
Though

Quea.~hM3 t:~

words are those of an intransigent Marxist ,

it is difficult not to be at least partially persuaded by
his argument after examining the strike figures in table 6 .
Trade union membership leaped by 1 .6 million in a mere four
years.

Those same four years saw more stoppages than at any

time in Britishi industrial history.

Anyone who sees the strike

wave to be but a temporary phenomenoh subsiding by the War
is belying the actual figures. 28 In fact, the number of dis27Benjamin Tillett, History of the London Transport
Worker's Strike 1..211 (London: NTWF Pub . , 1911), p. iii.
28A counter argument might be to note that the amount
of days lost actually was lower in 19.13 and 1914 than either
1909,1911, or 1912. The point I am making is that the number
of strikes, and thus the willingness to strike was not diminishing. 1911 and 1912's figures are bloated due to the effec t
of the Dockers' and Miners' strikes on all industries. In
fact, it is interesting to note that the amount of days lost
in 1914 was only a half year figure because of the war. If
one doubled it , it would be the second highest of the period .

J6
putes in 1914 was the second highest ever recorded .

Even

more remarkable is that all of the strikes in 1914 occurred
before the moratorium declared on disputes after the opening of the First World War in August of 1914.

The frustra-

tion of the twenty-five years before 191 0 finally exploded
in an incredible wave of strikes which stunned all of England
in the years 1910 to 1914.

In order to show how the growing

consciousness of this period was translated into action, it
is necessary to examine the nature of these strikes.
It is not the purpose of this section to give a complete
history of the strike wave of 1910 to 1914.29

A brief cata-

logue of the most important strikes of the period will give
the reader a sense of the utter chaos that many viewed the
period as representing.

On September 1, 1910, the miners in

the Rhondda Valley of S. Wales struck the Cambrian Combine
demanding a minimum wage to circumvent the unfairness of
piece-pay in abnormal places (bad seams).

The miners became

violent and were controlled only by Asquith sending General
Macready and the police in to quiet the strikers.

The miners

were eventually starved into submission.
August 8 , 1911 marked the beginning of the London Transport Workers attempt to get a minimum wage from Lord Devonport
of the Port of London Authority.

This was settled by the

arbitration mirac les of George Askwith and the threat of mili 29Askwith's is excellent and Dangerfield provides a
colorful if not always a ccurate account of the period .
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tary intervention by Winston Chrchill.

August 5 had seen the

Liverpool Railwaymen strike only to be appeased by Lloyd
George's plea f'or national unity during the Agadir Crisis .
March 1, 1912 witnessed the most dangerous strike as the
miners of the entire country went out demanding a minimum
wage.

This was eventually agreed to in principle (but not

in the actual wage) by an Act of Parliament.
went out again in May of' 1912 .

The Dockers

Five cabinet members tried

to settle this strike and f'ailed miserably.

The most notable

strike of 1 913 was in Dublin led by the charismatic lunatic
James Larkin.

The Dublin Transport Workers struck demanding

union recognition.

The TUC sent funds , but the union was

tragically starved into submission.
The most typical explanation of these strikes is to
put them under the general title of Syndicalism.
ism30

Syndical-

refers to the writings of' P9Uoutier and Sorel.

These

Frenchmen preached a gospel advocating a violent succession
of' continuous strikes, culminating in a "General Expropriatory
Strike" in which the workers woillld seize the means of production and take control of industry.

The producers were to

control all industries and all services.

Certainly many of'

the younger leaders of' the "new unionism " (Mann, Gosling, Tillett)
were influenced by Syndicalism. 31

There was some evidence

30 There are different shades of Syndicalism . . Sorel's
brand was much more violent and revolutionary and was the
most influential in England. There was also a more conservative shade which a Durkheim could approve · of'. This paper will
only deal with Sorel's "revolutionary" Syndicalism .
3 1 Dangerfield, p. 232.
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o£ this in the rail and dock strikes which were the most spectacular o£ the period.
true .

However, this argument is only partially

The British worker was not generally supportive o£

such violence and class. control.

Indeed, there was a good

deal more spontaneity in the strikes o£ the period.

Yet,

the lack o£ success by people such as Larkin and Mann in getting
substantial support £or sympathetic strikes reveals the limi ted in£luence o£ Syndicalism on the British worker.

It is

more correct to view revolutionary Syndicalism as one o£ the
most notable £orces o£ the period which helped crystallize
the worker's view o£ his position in society.3 2
The great bulk o£ stoppages were caused by much more
speci£ic grievances which had nothing to do with the violent
overthrow o£

th i:n~~rtrur~8r:rf~ ,

The major cause was o£ course

a demand £or a wage hike or even £or a Ih:ilimimumwwage.

This

desire £or a national minimum was symptomatic o£ a new Bri tish class consciousness.

Another major demand was £or union

recognition.

Be£ore 1910, most employers would not even deal

with unions.

Despite what many have argued (Danger£ield in

particular), the British worker was still interested in
working through established institutions and processes (i.e.
trade unionism and a Labour "Party").

The other major cause

o£ many strikes was related to this union issue.

There was

a growing trend among unionists to re£use to work with una£filiated men.

The Docker strike o£ May, 1912 was fought

)

3 2 Danger£ield, pp. 231-232.
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on this issue .

Thus, the causes of the unrest of 1910 to 1914

lie more in the fundamental changes that occurred in the late
nineteenth century and the material conditions of the period
than in a desire for revolution.
It should be noted that in many cases, the actions of
the go vernment exacerbated the industrial situation of these
years.

In particular, the threat and use of force in settling

s ome of these disputes helped unite the working class even
more .

The government appeared incompetent and unaware.
So far as the Government was concerned, Ministers
were immersed in constitutional struggles. They
had little or no labour policy. The Members of
the Government were strangely outside and ignorant
of the labour movements in the country; or of any
personal knowledge of the principal labour leaders . 33

This statement came from a man within the government; the
Board of Trade ' s own George Askwith.
that the government was

beleague~ ed

Yet, it must be said
by i t s battle with the

Lords , impending Irish Civil War, and the Suffragettes .

These

preoccupations confirmed a need for the working class to bind
closer together to safeguard its interests.

Many even felt

that the government had little interest in them and that the
social legislation of 1906 to 1914 was not very substantial .
Askwith himself contended that:
The Trade Disputes Act was carried on grounds of
political expediency ... the ' Coal Mines Regulation
of 1908 would never have got through if the Parliamentary representatives of labour in the House of
Commons had been a negligible quantity. The Old
Age Pensions Act and the Children's Act were long
overdue. The National Health Insurance Act of 191 1
33Askwith, p . 352 .
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was almost entirely due to the work of Sir Hubert
Llewellyn Smith.34
If someone within the government could feel this way about
the Liberals, there is little doubt that others felt the same.
The nature of the strikes of the period was such that
the entire working class was profoundly influenced by the
disputes.

The stoppages of the NTWF, NUR, and the MFGB were

felt by everyone.

Thus, by 1914 the worker had become acutely

sensitive to his distinctive position in society.

The growth

of education, the reduction in the work week, and the advances
in technology coupled with the events of 1910 to 1914 all
pointed to this fact.

The growth in trade union membership

and the centralization of the union world as a whole showed
that the worker did indeed feel a need to unite with his fellow
wage-earner.

Revolutionary Syndicalism and the actions of

the government all helped crystallize this new consciousness.
Thus, the years 1910 to 1914 saw the greatest potential for
change that the political system of England had had to face
in hundreds of years.

The worker would no doubt attempt to

achieve his aspirations through the political system.

But

this would now occur on his own terms and through his own
channels (trade Unionism).
"Political Unionism"
Attempting to link trade unionism to political action
is a difficult task.

One cannot hope to establish that a

3 4Askwith, p. 353.
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large growth in unionism was directly translated into an equal
growth in the political Labour movement .

Strong family tradi -

tions of voting Conservative or Liberal would not be abrogated
in a short space of time.

A large political Labour movement

was a new phenomenon and there was more of. a probability that
a

Labour~Liberal

coalition would form (as witnessed by the

Lib-Lab tradition in the coal-fields) than a strong independent political party .

Yet, because of a string of external

events which tended to conspire against Labour, the new consciousness of the worker was almost forced to take refuge in
an independent Labour movement.

While tracing these events,

it is productive to examine the transformation of class consciousness into political consciousness.

A brief study of

TUC conferences from the early 1890s through 1914 in conjunction with an examination of the external pressures of the
period will actually show the evolution of this "political"
unionism.
In 1892, the TUC passed a resolution supporting the es tablishment of the Independent Labour Party (ILP).35

There

had been earlier attempts at building a "Labour" party uniting
all wings of the British left.

The decisive factor was the

disillusionment that had set in after the failure of the "new
unionism" to expand after 1889.

By 1893, the TUC alone ( t here

were many unions not yet in the TUC) could boast a membership
of 900,000.3 6

Another major external development which spurred

35TUC Annual Conference Report (1 89~ ).
3 6 Ibid ", (1 893 )·
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the trade union movement on to more active and autonomous
political action was disappointment with the Liberal Government under Rosebery.37

The Liberal Party had been fairly

oblivious to the plight of the workingman

Datles"

~ejMg

an enca,.i;c).

tHi!U90CLtt'S

"!)6U'4;b

One of the results of this Li-

beral apathy can be seen in the increasingly "socialistic"
resolutions of the TUC.

Perhaps the most remarkable example

of this tendency was the passage of Keir Hardie ' s sweeping
resolution strongly stating:
That in the opinion of this Congress it is essential
to the maintenance of British industries to na t i:o,na lise the land and the whole means of production,
distribution, and exchange.38
This resolution won an impressive 219-61 vote of approval .
The spirit of this proclamation reflected a new political
consciousness on the part of trade unionism and at the same
time was a product of disenchantment.

Many more radical TUC

motions, though less sweeping in scope , were continually passed
throughout the decade.
The Taff Vale Judgement of 1901 did more to wed trade
unionism to politics than any other single force of the prewar period.

The unions were forced to support an independent

labour movement more strongly than ever before .

The establish-

ment of the Labour Representative Committee in 1900 was not
universally acclaimed in the Labour world.

But after Taff

Vale, this situation dramatically changed as the first truly
37 Clarke, Lancashire ami tthe New !liberalism ( Cambridge :
University Press, 1971), p~

effective parliamentary fund was set up in 1902.
the TUC's membership had reached 1.5 million.
the TUC passed a resolution in
The

e~~ect o~

election

o~

~avor o~

political unionism was

1906.

as the LRC's) in the entry
parliament.

Old Age Pensions.J9

The importance

o~
o~

o~

1909 overturning

in the

power~ully ~elt

(~or

its own

o~

the LRC,

bene~it

as well

twenty-nine Labour M.P.s to
political unionism was then

seen in practical terms through the passage
putes Act

That same year ,

With the increasing strength

the Liberal Party had acquiesced

By 1904,

Taf~

o~

the Trade Dis-

Vale.

Though the trade union movement was the major vehicle
~or

working class consciousness of the period, it was by no

means the only one.

Although they were the base

o~

the Labour

Party, the unions were not able to wrest control

o~

the LRC

~rom

Ramsay MacDonald and Keir Hardie.

A~ter

these early

attempts at control, the union movement began to work with
the LRC as a separate yet fraternal body.
political unionism

~rom

The history

1906 to 1914 is largely the story of

a growing cooperation between two distinct groups
ends.

o~

~or

common

One group was industrial and one group was political .

There of course was not complete harmony.40

But the term

political unionism begins to take on a different meaning as
we reach the War.

For as the Labour Party became politically

stronger, it was able to

e~~ectively

assert its operational

J9TUC Report (1902 ).
40S ee Tillett ' s I s the Parliamentary Labour Party a Failure?
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independence £rom the trade union movement . 41
In 1909, the TUC had grown to 1. 7 million members .

That

same year , it passed the £ollowing amendment:
This Congress is o£ the opinion that the establishment o£ a recognised minimum wage in all industries
is essential to the wel£are o£ the nation, and urges
the Labour Party in Parliament to introduce (such)
a measure. 4 2
This declaration shows a speci£ic interest in crossing trade
lines to aid the labour movement as a whole .

The trade union

movement had certainly come a long way £rom the separatism
which had marked the cra£t unions o£ the nineteenth century .
In 1910, there was yet another blow to political unionism
with the Osborne Judgement making it illegal to use union
£unds to support political activities .

This judgement would

be the true test o£ whether or not the TUC was committed to
an independent political Labour movement.

The TUC rose to

the occasion by strongly denouncing the Osborne Judgement in
1910,1911, and 1912.

In 1911, the TUC went on to unanimously

pass resolutionscalling £or the nationalization

.'Ocf'

the railways .

It also passed a resolution congratulating the strikers o£
that year.43
In 1913, the last year be£ore the Great War, political

)

41 The major proo£ £or this was the change in status o£
the trade councils a£ter 1910. These industrial groups had
£ormerly been the points o£ local contact £or the LRC. But
a£ter 1910, the trend had been towards these groups giving up
theirt a:.§filia ti(b,na t :fu. -£aYor:f e£c.sol:e IYl"pol:±t~cai tboElies:;- ' ~ 5'_ehapter
2 provides more detail on this development .
42TUC Report (1909).
43Ibid., (1911).
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unionism reached its zenith.44

The executive of the TUC tri -

umphantly announced that there were now 2,232 million members.
The second major accomplishment of the conference was the
successful fusion of the TUe, Labour Party, and General Federation of Trade Unions which had first been discussed in 1911.
This meant that these three bodies would house their offices
in the same building.

A Joint Board would be set up to es-

tablish political rules for trade unions to insure closer
cooperation and at the same time maintain the separation
between the industrial and political wings of the movement.
But by far the most important development was the TUC's reac tion to the Trade Unions Act of 1913.

After four years of

constant pressure, the Liberal Government had finally overturned the Osborne Judgement, but with one condition.

Each

union would have to hold a vote to determine whether or not
it would set up a parliamentary fund.

Those individuals who

voted no could in effect "contract out" of paying a levy
supporting the Labour Party.

The challenge had been made

and the future of the Labour Party now hung in the balance.
The TUC laid to rest any question of where it stood.

In an

overwhelming vote of confidence, the Congress passed a reso lution strongly insisting on the establishment of a parlia)

mentary fund. 4 5

Later that year, most unions voted to set

up the individual funds. 46
44By 1913, the influence of revolutionary Syndicalism
was diminishing. See Dangerfield, pp. 314-330.
45TUC Report (1913).
46Ros s McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party (London:
Oxford Press, 1974), p~l.
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Between 1886 and 1914 , the working ct:Utas movement in Great
Britain had indeed come a long way.

Created by a variety of

revolutionary changes during the 1870s and '80s , the Labour
movement was transformed from a nebulous new spirit to a very
tangible and distinctly British political consciousness by
1914.

Certain external events served as catalysts in causing

the political unionism of the early 1900s.

This consciousness

then crystallized in the form of trade unionism and a separate
and independent political movement.
turn to the Labour Party .

It is now

natu~al

to

For its history is the history of

that very peculiar British working class conscia usness which
took shape in these years.

The Labour Party's story was

filled with the same types of contradictions, constraints ,
and excitement that were the essence of the new working class .

CHAPTER II
ASQUITH'S FLUNKEYS
Suddenly politicians of all parties realise that a
new factor in politics has appeared; that organised
labour as a political force is already a menace to
the easygoing gentlemen of the old school.
(LRC Annual Conference-1906)

The General Election of 1906 proved to be the greatest
landslide in the history of British politics.

The Liberal

Party sent no less than 400 M.P.s to parliament and could
count on the support of an additional 113 M.P. s .1

Perhaps

the most startling result of the election was the appearance
of twenty-nine M. P . s from the young Labour Party.

In six

short years, the Labour Representative Committee had become
a force to be reckoned with.

Thus, a major question which

arose after 1906 was whether or not this Labour Party would
continue its march flarward and become the successor to the
Liberal Party?

The purpose of this chapter is to answer this

tantalizing question.

Did the Labour Party after 1906 pose

a real threat to Campbell-Bannerman's party?
ll\U tchell and Freeman, British Political Facts, p. 122 .
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Early History
On February 27, 1900, 129 men crowded into Memorial Hall
in London and passed the £ollowing resolution:
A Resolution in £avor o£ establishing a distinct
Labour Group in Parliament, who should have their
own Whips and agree upon their policy which must
embrace a readiness to co-operate with any party,
which £or the time being may be engaged in promoting legislation in the direct interest o£ Labour,
and be equally ready to associate themselves with
any party in opposing measures having an opposite
tendency.2
The L.R.C. had been born.

Yet, £rom its inception, the party ' s

£ortunes were £raught with di££iculty.

For liThe Labour Party

(was) a Federation consisting o£ Trade Unions, Trade Councils,
Socialist Societies, and Local Labour Parties." 3

Included

in this £ederation were the Social Democratic Federation,
the Fabian Society, and the Independent Labour Party.

These

groups spanned the entire spectrum o£ British working class
ideology.
Siilnce the early 1880s, the le£t in England had been badly
splintered over how the working class ' s interests could best
be served.

The S.D.F. o£ Hyndman and Quelch was a strong

group o£ intransigent Marxists who openly preached class war£are.

Shaw, Pease, and the Webbs 6£ the Fabian society were

middle class intellectuals who£avored social re£orm within
the constraints o£ the parliamentary system.

Keir Hardie's

I.L.P. was £ounded in 1893 as a result o£ the disillusionment
2Philip P. Poirier, The Advent o£ the Labour Party (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., .1958), p. 84 .
3LRC Annual. Comerence Report (1910), p. 112.

that accompanied the limited success of the "new Unionism"
of 1889.

The I . L.P. was primarily a socialist and working

class party but possessed neither the intransigence of the
S.D.F. nor the intellectual snobbery of the Fabians.

Hardie

and Ramsay MacDonald were pragmatists who throughout the 1890s
searched for practical solutions to working class problems.
It was the I . L.P. which was able to join these other groups
together.

With the blessing of the Trades Union Congress,

Hardie was finally able to fuse working class interests into
a united political movement.

It is important to realize that

most trade unions were traditionally Liberal. - It was only
after the disappointment of Rosebery ' s government that serious
thought was given to distinct Labour representation.

Thus ,

the uneasy alliance which had been forged in Memorial Hall
was more a product of disenchantment than a result of a
common political consciousness.
As a result of the disparate nature of the L.R.C., two
major problems presented themselves immediately to the National
Executive Committee.

R.T. McKenzie has defined these diffi-

culties as "problems of coherence and control".4

Naturally,

it was expected that a "Labour Party" would put forth a specific programme of action.
)

Yet , because of the vast ideolo-

gical differences between the S.D.F., the Fabians, the Unions ,
and the I.L . P., it was _impossible to take any strong line of
action.

It is true that most members of the L.R . C. were

4 R . T . McKenzie, British Political Parties ( London:
William Hetnemann Ltd., 1955), p. 385.
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socialists, but of different degrees and types.

Thus, in

order to maintain their fragile alliance , Hardie and the I.L.P .
took it upon themselves to steer a delicate course between
the more extreme S.D.F . and the more conservative tradeUcrUonists.

The S.D.F . attempted to turn the L.R.C. into an avowedly

Marxist organization.

In a resolutioh, they felt that the

new party should be:
... based upon the recognition of the class war,
and having for its ultimate object the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and
exchange.5
This proposal was soundly defeated.

Hardie maintained that

"the propaganda of the class hatred is not one which can ever
take root in this country ... Mankind in the mass is not moved
by hatred but by h rve of what is right.

If we could have

socialism on the S.D.F . lines nothing would be changed-save
for the worse.,,6

Hardie and MacDonald had to be very careful

not to alienate the trade unionists who made up two-thirds of
the L . R.C.

Thus MacDonald would insists that "Socialism has

to be adapted to the organisation of the state."?

The pre-

carious balance of the L.R.C was maintained only by deliberately
keeping the programme ideologically ambiguous.

Therefore,

the L.R.C. was at first. little more than an interest group
whc$4. aim was to alleviate certain specific legal and social
disabilities of the working class.
5G...D. H. Cole, Britishi Working Class Politics: 1832-"t914
( London: George Rout l edge & Sons, Ltd., 1944), p. 15?
6Po irier, p. 14J.
?Ibid., p . 92 .
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A more serious difficulty which was to plague the Labour
Partythroughout its first eighteen years was the problem of
control.

The L.R.C . was more or less " thrust" upon the po -

litical scene by a variety of groups.

The question of who

would exert control over the party was fundamental for the
firs t five years.

The S.D.F. attempted to impose a socialist

test on all L.R.C . candidates .

But a party made up primarily

of trade unionists was not ready to accept such control from
as small a group as Hyndman's.
the L.R.C. in August of 1901.

The S.D.F. subsequently left
Despite their small numbers,

the socialists did supply much of the inspiration for the
party.

A much more serious threat to the N.E.C. came from

the unionists.

This challenge was embodied in Ben Tillett ' s

1905 resolution insisting:
That it be an instruction to the Executive of the
L.R.C. to enforce the hearty adoption by L . R.C.
candidates of all legislative proposals emanating
from the Trades Union Congress. In view of the
refusal of candidates, that it be the pre-emptory
duty of the Executive to refuse or discontinue
support financially and morally to said candidate
or candidates.~
This resolution was resoundingly defeated 537 to 245. 9

Yet ,

it raised in its clearest form the problem of an independent
party.

It is essential to understand that more than anything

else, independence, both from within and without of the party,
was the most important goal of the leaders of the L. R.C.

The

founding resolution in Memorial Hall was the essence of

this

8Mckenzie, p. 389 .
9Ibid., p. 390.
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resolve .
How was it possible for a party such as the L.R.C. to be
truly independent?

This dilemma came to the forefront at

the 1903 conference in Newcastle.
at this time was one Richard Bell.

The chairman of the L.R.C.
The president of the Amal -

gamated Railway Servants Union, Bell had always been a strong
Lib-Lab advocate.

The problem was that Bell ascha;irman had

constantly compromised the position of the LRC by appearing
on Liberal platforms and supporting Liberal candidates against
L.R.C . men.

In reaction to Bell and the general tendency to

stray from the Labour fold, the so-called "Newcastle Resolution "
was adopted which fundamentally revised the object of the LRC.
To secure, by united action, the election to Parliament of candidates promoted, in the first instance,
by an Affiliated Society or Societies in the constituency, who undertake to form or join a distinct group
in Parliament, with its own whips and its own policy
on Labour questions, to abstain strictly from identi fying themselves with or promoting the interests of
any section of the Liberal or Conservative Parties,
and not to oppose any other candidate recognized by
this committee. All such candidates shall pledge
themselves to accept this constitution, to abide by
the decisions of the Group in carrying out the aims
of this constitution or resign, and to appear before
their constituencies under the title Labour candidates only:.10
This amendment reveals both the weaknesses and tenacity of
the young L.R.C.

The party was forced to reaffirm its original

position and to spell out in black and white a policy which
would not have been necessary in a stronger party.

Though

the resignation clause was removed in 1904, the "Newcastle
Resolution" became the cornerstone of the I.L.P .' s efforts
10Mckenzie, p. 387.
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to keep the L . R.C . on an independent course .
The founding of the L.R.C. was a triumph for Hardie and
MacDonald.

Though there were serious difficulties in the

nature of the Labour Alliance, the combination which the I . L . P .
had striven for throughout the 1890s was finally a reality .
Early Organization
Ramsay MacDonald wrote in later years that "For six years
the party was allowed to grow in obscurity . II11

Though this

observation was a bit romantic, it does convey the
serenity of the early years.

re~ ative

The L.R.C. slowly evolved an

organization which was able to make modest in-roads on the
Liberal Party until 1906.

From one perspective, this organi -

zation proved stifling and created much internal strife.

Yet,

on the whole, a fairly effective machine was assembled.
The L.R.C. of 1900 had a membership of 353,070.

Many

unions (most conspicuously the miners) were as yet not affili ated.

The major impetus for membership came from the courts

in 1901 with the Taff Vale decision making unions liable for
monetary losses incurred from strikes.

The unions were forced

to support political action in order to have this crippling
decision repealed.

By 1902, the number of affiliated unions

had risen from forty-one to sixty-five and the membership was
up to 455,450. In 1903, there were 127 unions with 847,315
members. 12 Two of the largest unions, the engineers and the
11Cole, p. 165.
12 Po irier, p. 141.
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cotton~spinners

had finally joined the L. R.C . in 1903.

By

July 1902, a Parliamentary fund had been set up and was in
full operation to pay M.P.s.

Along with this numerical growth

were several stunning political successes.

In 1901 no M.P.s

other than Hardie and Bell represented the L.R.C.

But in

late 1902, David Shackleton won an important by-election in
Clitheroe.

An even more astounding victory was Will Crook's

win at Woolwich in early 1903.

The addition of Arthur Henderson

at Barnard Castle in 1903 gave the L.R.C. a new-found respect
and made the party a force that had to be taken into account.
The organizations that ran the campaigns for Shackleton ,
Crooks, and Henderson were a motley collection of local I.L.P.
branches, Trade Councils, and local L.R.C.s.

Because the

L.R.C. was origInally founded as a working class federation,
candidatures were left up to affiliated groups who would make
nominations and pay for election expenses.

Most trade unions

collected a levy of one pence a year from each member for
the purpose of politics.

Yet, there was not lias yet any uni-

form system or organization for the whole of the country." 1 3
Approved societies would simply send in nominations to the
N.E.C. and most of these were then approved.
itnately~1

By 1906, approx-

one hundred local L.R.C. s were in existence.

the problem of local jealousies haunted these groups.

Yet,
Several

attempts were made to allow local L.R.C.s to directly affiliate
with the national party .
13Mckenzie, p. 467.

But the trade councils, those in-
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congruous industrial bodies which represented all trades of
an area, refused to give up their political power though they
were primarily industrial groups.

Those local L.R.C.s which

grew in areas not covered by the trade councils were allowed
to affiliate .

Even at the local level, the delicate alliance

of socialists and unionists had to be treated with the utmost
caution.
An even more unusual problem was that only exceptionally ,

as at Woolwich, Poplar, and Barnard Castle, were individuals
allowed to join the L.R.C. directly.

Otherwise, one could

become a member only by joining an affiliated body.
difficult to call the L . R.C. a party by 1906.

It was

MacDonald

admitted that the L.R.C. still had " the limited mind of a
Committee".14
being.

Yet a parliamentary party had been called into

It was a heterogeneous organization which revealed

the tensions and ambiguities of the Memorial Hall Conference .
It was at this stage that the political genius of Ramsay MacDonald propelled the L.R.C. out of its "obscurity" and into
the national limelight.
The hallmark of the Labour Party ' s early successes was
pragmatism.

The I.L. P. had been able to found the L.R.C.

only because it was aware of the realities of such an alliance .
The Labour Party won twenty-nine seats in 1906 only because
MacDonald realized the necessity of making a deal with the
Liberals.

In a series of secret meetings throughout 1903

between MacDonald, Herbert Gladstone, the Liberal Chief Whip ,
14Mckenzie, p . 469.

and his assistant, Jesse Herbert, the L.R.C. was given a free
run in thirty seats.

Hardie knew of these meetings and approved

of the compact as a political necessity .

The result was

astounding) giving the L.R.C. 37% of the vote in the fifty
seats they contested in 1906.

However, this electoral bonanza

concealed a much more fundmental result of the 1906 election
for both the Liberal and what was now the Labour Party .
"Lib-Labism "
The Labour Party ' s relationship with the Liberal Party
before 1914 is one of the most important factors that must
be taken into consideration when assessing the political si tuation of this period.

In attempting to ascertain whether

or not the pre-war Labour Party was already a challenge to
the Liberals, it becomes essential to distingiish the two
groups. from each other .

There are three

8JL>SaS

in particular

which are useful in putting Lib-Labism into perspective:
ideological comparisions, political relationships, and rank
and file comparisiDns::;i .
Since the second half of the nineteenth century , the
Liberal Party had come to support and become identified wi th
religious Nonconformity, Irish Home Rule, and Free Trade.
The ministries of Gladstone had thrived on these issues through out the period.

However, towards the end of the century, a

subtle shift began within the Liberal Party to meet the growing
demand for solutions to unemployment, sickness , and economic
inequality.

Hw:::.evtlI"h'S-

"Death Duties"

THQPO

2Il_JiiHiFly Qxamp~
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0,£ this "Nev~ Liberalism".

The major ideological revolution

occurred at the turn o£ the century with the works o£ Hobson
and Hobhouse in particular.
£orth~;:m.itlesizing

A comprehensive view was put

the older Liberal ideals and the new theories

o£ Socialism, Idealism, and Darwinism.
responsibility £or the individual. .

Society was to take

The reasons £or this

were varied.· The collectivists (e.g. T.H. Green) held a view
o£ society which stressed the moral necessity o£ helping the
individual and the empirical reality o£ man as a social creature.

The "Millian" notion developed by Hobson and emphasi-

zing the economic bene£its that would accrue to the society
as a whole by keeping the worker employed, imormed this "New
Liberalism" with a more traditional individualistic £lavor
that had been connected with the older in£luences on Liberalism ( e.g. Christian Socialism and Noncon£ormity).

The £inal

impetus to this new ideology was derived £rom the evolutionary
theories o£ Darwin and Spencer which argued that society had
developed as an organic whole.

Thus the new Liberals could

argue that helping an individual (or a part o£ the total
society) was in essence only helping society as a whole. 15
Sir William Harcourt was quite right when he said as early
as the late 1880s that "We are all socialists now".16
A£ter 1906, the radicals o£ the Liberal Party openly
espoused this new ideology and attempted to put it into prac15Freeden
gives an excellent account o£ this entire
phenomenon in The New Liberalism.
16Freeden, p . 25 .
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tice.

The budget of 1909, the National Health Insurance Act,

and all of the other landmark measures of social reform enacted
by the Liberals from 1906 to 1914 should be seen within the
framework of this new political theory .

The entire Liberal

Party did not of course openly embrace this "New Liberalism".
Many have argued that these policies alienated large segments
of the Liberal Party.

In particular , the wealthier free -

traders who held the purse-strings were not enamored of Lloyd
George and his radical cronies.

Some historians have gone so

far as to argue that with the decline of Nonconformity in
England, the Liberal Party had lost the catalyst which had
sustained it as a viable party.17
The Labour Party of 1906 was still a group without a
programme.

Their major goal was the repeal of Taff Vale which

was accomplished that very year in the Trades Disputes Act.
The other major policies pursued were the Right to Work Bill
and Old Age Pensions. Io.Qologically, the MacDonald wing of
the party was congruous to the political thought of the "New
Liberals" .

The Labour Party heartily supported Lloyd George's

budget and most of the Liberal legislation.

Thus, it is very

difficul t to distinguish the id,e ological thrust of the bulk
of the Labour Party from the increasingly influential radical
)

wing of the Liberal Party.
At the political level, Lib-Labism is a less tidy matter
to deal with.

The Gladstone-MacDonald entente held great

17 John-E. Glaser, "English Nonconformity and the Decline
of Liberalism", American Historical Review 63 (January, 1958 ).
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potential for both parties .

From the perspective of 190) , the

pact seemed attractive to both sides.

For the Liberals :

"The

gain to the party through a working agreement would be great ,
and can be measured best by a comparison of ' no arrangement '
with those (results) of ' an arrangement ,,! ;8

Indeed Labour

had begun to lay important foundations for electoral support
in the North.

Much of the working class in Lancashire and

Yorkshire was traditionally Tory.

With men such as

'Shackle -

ton drawing Conservative support to the Labour Party in Cli theroe, an electoral deal was certainly beneficial to the
Liberals.

But if the Liberals made no pact, Jesse Herbert

pointed out that "the Liberal Party would suffer defeat not
only in those constituencies where L.R.C. candidates fought ,
but also in almost every borough, and in many divisions , of
Lancashire and Yorkshire.

This would be the inevitable result

of unfriendly action towards the L.R.C .... (The L.R.C.) They
would be defeated, but so also would (the Liberals) be defeated .,,1 9

The benefits of such an agreement to the Labour

Party were even greater.

With a still primitive organization ,

Labour could not hope to compete equally with the vast resources of the established Liberal Party .

Free runs in agreed

locales would save much money for both parties.

More impor-

tantly, the pact would provide Labour with a bridgehead to
enter the political arena on a large scale for the first time .
18Poirier , p . 189 .
19Ibid.
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The immediate advantages of the pact to the Liberal Party
tendeds to obscure the long-range effect of such an agreement.
The most obvious result was to allow Labour an independent
political existence.

Many Liberals felt that allowing Labour

a free run in Tory areas was compromising the party's posi tion.

Philip Stanhope, Shackleton's opponent at Clitheroe

worried about the effects of

accom~dation

and claimed that

"If the Liberal Party can only be made strong by giving away
its strongest positions, all I can say is that its day of
usefulness is gone. ,,20

The traditional Liberals (middle-class

free traders) best typified by Alfred Illingworth of Bradford
actually left the party over this policy.

By allowing Labour

free runs, the momentum that had been begun by Taff Vale and
fueled by the by-election victories at Clitheroe, Woolwich,
and Barnard Castle was translated practically to the organizational level.

The surprising nature of these early vic-

tories was now structuralized and was given a realistic chance
of enduring.

Thus, a Labour Party had now been institution-

alized by the Gladstone-MacDonald parley.
Yet, the underlying contradictions posed by Lib-Labism
for the Labour Party were great.

The "Newcastle Resolution"

was a real stumbling block for MacDonald.

Independence had

been crucial to the perpetuation of the party and this seemed
to be deflated by the accord with the Liberals.

This was a

major reason why the Gladstone negotiations were held in
20Poirier, p . 202 .

utmost secrecy.

Though at a practical level , the pact pro -

vided and sustained independence, from a more fundamental
vantage point the entente tended to water-down the working
class nature of the Labour Alliance.

Would Lib-Labism be

the force that would eventually absorb the Labour Party into
the Liberal Party?

It was only through MacDonald ' s firm insis -

tance on the specific agreements with the Liberals that pre vented the party from losing its existence.

In fact, we

shall see that after 1910, the Liberal Party did break some
of the agreements in several constituencies which served to
help unify the Labour Party before 1914.

The most important

problem caused by Lib-Labism for the Labour Party was its
effect on the rank and file.
One of the majoD reasons that the I. L. P. had been formed
in the 1890s was the general lack of working class candidates
in either major party.

There had been a growing antipathy

towards the Liberal Party as it had continually rejected
working class candidates and had the annoying habit of intro ducing its own men where L.R . C. men were already standing.
The most blatant examples of this were in 1903 when Liberals
were selected at Stockton-on-Tees, Sunderland, and most notably
Barnard Castle against Henderson.
)

With the Gladstone-MacDonald

pact and the subsequent deals for 1906, disillusionment with
the parliamentary party began to grow.

This was exacerbated

by the seemingly moderate stances ' of the party in the Commons .
A militant socialist movement began to grow at this time and
the entire issue came to a head in 1907 at the by-election
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for Colne Valley .
Victor Grayson , a young socialist was selected as the
candidate for Colne Valley by the local I.L.P.

The N.E.C.

turned down his nomination because the local branches that
nominated him were not affiliated with the national party.
In a "passionate and tumultuous" campaign, Grayson won without
official Labour support.

His victory became symbolic of the

growing discord within the party.

At the I.L . P. conference

in 1908 , these tensions came out in the open.

Jim Larkin of

Ireland said he "would not sink his socialism in the Labour
Party" and exclaimed "socialists for Grayson, the remainder
for yo.ursel ves . ,,21This t iYipe of sentiment became characteristic
of the Labour Party after this period.

The National Executive

was constantly and effectively being attacked by the militant
wing of the party.

The most eloquent critic was of course

the omnipresent wizard of the NFTW Ben Tillett, who described
the N.E.C. as "Press flunkeys to Asquith" and as "sheer hypocrites " .

Tillett went on to claim that MacDonald and Henderson

would "for ten and five guineas a time ... lie with the best" .
The N.E.C. was "softly feline in their purring to Ministers
and their patronage . .. repaying with gross betrayal the class
that willingly supports them . ,,22
The cUlmination of this attitude came in the September,
1908 by-election at Newcastle.

Newcastle was one of the

21David Marquand, Ramsa~ M?cDonald ( London :
Cape , 1977), p. 107. ..
22Mckenzie, p . 395.

Jonathan

constituencies covered by MacDonald ' s entente with Gladstone .
When the Liberal seat fell vacant and a Labour man was nominated, MacDonald was quick to force his withdrawal.

When

this occurred, the Social Democratic Party put up a candidate
and the Newcastle I.L.P . supported him.
date was badly defeated .

The S.D.P. candi-

Yet , this rebellion began a trend

which MacDonald and Henderson had to constantly try to check
after 1908.
The Executive was in most cases able to assert its authority effectively and maintain cordial relations with the
Party.

There was real rank and file dissatisfaction.

Libe~al

Yet ,

it must be remembered that the Labour Party was overwhelmingly
dominated by trade unionists, both in numbers and funds.

The

socialists were occasionally pacified by the acceptance of
more leftist resolutions at national conferences.
the N.E.C. was growing stronger every year.

However ,

The contro l

problem that plagued the party in its early years was no longer
as severe as it once was .

The salient feature of the first

ten years of the Labour Party was its opportunism and its
ability to consolidate each gain.
Though called into exis tence by external socia-economic
forces and the dissatisfaction of the time, the Labour Party
)

was an institution very much shaped and defined by the traditions and constraints of the British electoral system.

The

first major impetus for the party's growth came from the
system,~

inirt.ne form of the Taff Vale Judgement.

The diff icul-

ties posed by a political system that was not favorable towards

64
third parties was somewhat avoided by the Gladstone-MacDonald
pact.

Yet, perhaps even more important to the early years

of Labour's existence was the pragmatism and political acumen
of its leaders.

The contradictions inherently part of the

Memorial Hall Conference were glossed over in such a way as
to actually benefit the party.

Yet, the Grayson revolt was

the first sign of trouble brewing in the rank and file.

This

*1-

challenge along with the tumult of years 1910 to 1914 presented
the party with an entirely new set of problems.

Thus, the

last four years before the war were critical for the survival
of Labour.

The ways in which these problems and challenges
were met and solved la; 1• d the foundation for the future of a
Labour Party that would survive the Liberal Party and the
upheavals of the greater portion of the twentieth century.
The Evolution of the Labour Party :

191 0-14

(a)-Constraints
"The year upon which we have just entered is likely to
be a momentous one for Labour ... Labour has become aggressive ,
and is not merely opposing attack, but is determined upon
advances . ,,23

And so Philip Snowden greeted the year 1910.

1910 was indeed to be an important year; not just for the

Labour Party but for the country as well.
a new chapter in British history.

1910 was to open

The next four years were

to be tumultuous and full of uncertainty.

For the Labour

Party , those four years were to present the N.E.C. with an
23Askwith, p. 175 .
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entirely new set of challenges .

Yet some of the old Ubiqui -

tous problems of the party were still imluential in these
years.

It is therefore important to first examine some of

the traditional constraints of the British political system

a;~how they affected the fortunes of the Labour Party.

These

constraints were products of both the external political situation of the period and the internal obstacles engendered
by the nature of the party machine and the political system .
The second half of this section will trace the variety of
new stimuli 'Nhich began to mold Labour into a party after
1910.

By the time World War I broke out, the Labour Party

had reached a critical juncture in its development.

The

purpose of this section is to understand what that juncture was .
The year 1910 marked the beginning of the constitutional
struggle over the House of Lords.

The fight over the Parlia-

ment Act led to the reopening of the question of Irish Home
Rule and the possibility of impending civil war.

These crises

were the most time-consuming and important matters of the
day.

Their effect on the Labour Party was direct and crippling .

At the party comerence at Newport in 1910, it was strongly
stated that:
The grave constitutional issues which are at stake
will now have to be fought to a finish. The Liberal
Party will hardly be able to draw back, and the House
of Lords will have to be dealt with before any Pa2~y
can make substantial progress with social reform.
This remark illustrates the difficulty the party found itself
)

24Labour Party Comerence Report (1910), p.2 .
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in.

Certainly Labour did support the Liberals in their efforts

to reform the House of Lords and pass Lloyd George's budget.
But to relegate "Labour" issues to a secondary position seemed
to compromise the purpose of the party.

With the probability

of one or more General Elections on the horizon, Labour was
caught in a bind.

Philip Snowden years later would admit

that :
It must be said in justice that the position of
the Labour Party in that Parliament (1909-10) was
very difficult. They had really to choose between
a Liberal and a Tory Government. There was nothing
to be hoped for from a Tory Government but reaction.
The Liberal Government in the main was going slowly
in our way.25
COUld the Labour Party take the responsibility for bringing
the Liberals down?

There was no doubt that such a strategy

would do immeasurable harm to the future of the party.

The

Labour Party held most of its seats by the grace of the Liberal
Party .

The Liberal chief whip, J.A. Pease warned the Labour

leaders that "if an aggressive attitude was persisted in by
the Labour Party, Labour could not expect official Liberalism
to stand on one side ."

In a list of threats, Pease went on

to say that "Liberal legislation has not been in the past,
nor in the future is likely to be, much influenced by members
who claim no

l~yal ty

to the Govermment ... That the issues of

the next General Election are such that all Liberal, Radical,
and Labour members can wfule-heartedly unite in supporting . ,, 26
25Philip Viscount Snowden, An Autobiography, 2 vols.
( London: Ivo'r Nicholson and Watson, 1934), 1:216.
26McKibbin, The Evolution ~ pp. 152-53 .

Not only would the Liberal Party react sharply to any meddling
by the Labour Party at a time of utmost political delicacy,
but in a larger sense, they would not allow any further expansion of Labour into new seats .

Pease said "That if they (Labour)

now press L.R.C. candidates for seats which were won by Liberals,
or Labour members who have not signed the constitution (LibLabs) they must expect retaliatory attacks on their own candidates standing for those seats which they now hold.,,27

A

pragmatist such as a MacDonald could accept this situation.
But how would the rank and file react to such a whow of weakness and dependence on the part of the leaders of their party?
The entire question of dependence was of course raised
after MacDonald's deal with the Liberals in 190).

But after

1909, the problem of political dependence was superseded by
an even more dangerous possiblity.

"By pressing labour and

social legislation on the Liberal Government the Labour Party
was enhancing the prestige of the Liberals as a social reform
party, and weakening the case for independent Labour representation ... The Labour Party lost no opportunity of claiming
credit for the Liberal social legislation, but I doubt if
that argument carried conviction."28
of the situation was quite correct.

Snowden'S assessment
The effect was to exacerbate

the divisions wi thin the party that had begun at Colne Valley.
With the National Health Insurance Act in 1911, the socialists
27McKibbin, p. 153 .
28Snowden, p . 217 .
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in the party had yet another reason for disgruntlement .

For

the Act's major feature (which the N.E.C. had gone along with )
was that the worker would have to contribute out of his pay
check for his own insurance.

J. Bromley of the Enginemen's

Federation vocalized the feelings of many when he said his
union had "become disgusted by this Liberal-Labour representation; and we have been unable to shut our eyes to the fact
that our party has tied itself most clo s ely to the Liberal
Party. "29

At the 1910 I.L.P. conference, Hardie himself

claimed that the Labour Party had "ceased to count".3 0
The results of the January, 1910 election confirmed the
belief that Labour was strongly dependent on the Liberal
Party.3 1

Of seventy-eight candidates who stood, fifty-one

ran for seats held by Labour at sometime since 1906.
fifty-one, only three faced Liberal opposition.

Of these

Twenty-four

new seats were contested, and only three were won; all three
being unopposed by the Liberals.

Thus, as Neal Blewett con-

tends , Labour had indeed been "contained".

The effect of

this blow to Labour expansion was to reduce the number of
seats fought in the December election to the bare minimum .
Only fifty-six were fought and only those in which the party
had a good chance of winning.

Thus , by the end of 1910, La-

bour nationally appeared to be in very bad shape.

The party ' s

29TUC Annual Report (1913) .
3 0Marquand, p. 127.
31N_eal Blewett, The Peers; the Parties and the People
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972},p. 241.

hands were tied by both the fear of turning the Liberals out
of the government and the fear of turning themselves out of
the Commons .
Several institutional constraints served to entrench
Labour in its sad predicament.

The British electoral system

was not normally a helpful vehicle for the realignment of
parties .

The British voter was very influenced by the tradi-

tional voting habits of his family.3 2

The prospects for a

third party's chances were indeed bleak during this period .
Naturally, the question of the extent of the franchise arises
when one -talks of the political system.
males were qualified to vote.

Only 60% of all adult

Yet, because of the complexity

of the registration process and the 12-month residency requirement (to say nothing of plural voting), a "roughly representative" system did in fact conspire against the working class
and the Labour Party (though whether MacDonald would have
challenged more seats even with universal suffrage is highly
debatable).3J

All of these impediments were certainly problem-

atic for the Labour Party.

But

pe~haps

the most debilitating

obstacle came from the courts.
The financial basis for the Labour Party had of course
come from the unions.
tions for political

The legality of trade union contribu-

~epresentation

had never been questioned .

J2David Butl,e r and David Stokes, Political Change in
Britain (New York: St . Martin's Press, 1971), p. 49.
33Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace 1906;..18
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp . 3-11 .

)

70
But in the Osborne Judgement of late 1 909 , the courts ruled
that this practice was illegal.

The effect of the judgement

was not as bad as had been expected.

But it certainly hampered

possible electoral growth. ' The party got around it only by
reducing its candidatures for the 1910 elections.

The loss

to Labour was at least 20,000 pounds and it caused an immediate loss in membership and created tensions with some unions. 34
The Osborne Judgement did add to Liberal-Labour antipathy
as the decision was not reversed until 191J.
forced the Liberals to allow the

~ayment

But it finlly

of M. P . s in 1911.

Thus, the problems of the young Labour Party of 1910 were
great.

The possibility of superseding the Liberal Party within

a short space of time was all but impossible.

Yet, the period

from 1910 to 1914 did see the beginning of a slow evolution
in the organization of the party which presented the Liberal
Party with severe challenges.
(b)-Stimuli
In 1906 the Labour Party had almost 1,000,000 members
out of an electorate of about 7.2 million.J.5

By 1912, this

number had risen to almost 1.9 million (out of about 7 . .5
million) and the number of affiliated constituency and central
parties had jumped from eighty-three to 146. 36

In the January

1910 election, Labour was able to spend 881 pounds per canI. '

J 4McKibbin, pp. 2 0-21.
3.5Butler and Freeman, p . 122 .
36 Ibid.,
' p . 98 .
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didate compared to 1,075 pounds by the Liberals.

In the De-

cember election, 736 pounds was spent compared to the Liberal ' s
882 pounds per candidate. 37

By '~1i 191 p:, \' I the annual conference

could boast of sales of over 5.8 million pieces of political
propaganda. 38

By 1909, the miners had finally voted to affi-

liate with the party.

Despite all of these seemingly healthy

signs of growth, Keir Hardie was forced to admit that:
•.. we have not yet evolved either the organization
or the espirit de corps which would enable us to
cope successfully with our oppoBents.39
Labour's poor 36.6% of the vote in contested seats was chalked
up to the Osborne Judgement and the out of date register. 40
The N.E.C. had a major task in reorganization to make the
party mechanically sound.
major problems.

MacDonald's goal was to solve three

There were still local peculiarities within

regional parties which led to autonomy and some rebellion
from the rank and file.

Affiliated bodies were not taking

their responsibilities seriously.

Finally, the miners had

to be reminded that they were now members of the Labour Party.41
The next four years were to be crucial in the evolution of the
party.
In 1911, Arthur Henderson became the secretary of the
37Blewett, p. 290.
38 Labour Party Conference (1910).
39Ibid., p. 55.
41McKibbin,p. 19 .

~QI;t])id.
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Labour Party .

With his arrival , organization was given an

important jolt and MacDonald's three goals after the elections
of 1910 were largely achieved .

The problem of strengthening

local parties and making them more uniform was accomplished
in several ways.

Additional agents and national organizers

were appointed from 1910 to 1914 to canvass local parties
and insure more efficiency and control.

This was made possible

by the decision to give aid from the Head Office to local
parties.

MacDonald and Henderson were able to insure this

in 1912 by linking the giving of aid to greater efficiency
by requiring that applications for financial assistance "be
accompanied by a complete statement showing the affiliated
local party ' s composition and details of i ills organization.,,42
This gave the N.E.C. more control over local parties and cut
back an local autonomy.

Another important development in

securing uniformity occurred with the founding of central
parties in both London and Glasgow by 1914.

This greatly

eased the task of organization in these areas.
The affiliation of the miners in 1909 was of course a
major achievement.

But the miners had been traditional Lib-

Labers and their membership was more nominal than real.

They

refused to work through Labour machinery and were a cause for
much consternation at Head Office.

After 1911, Henderson

decided it was time to take direct action in forging true
cooperation with the miners .
42McKibbin, p.)).

The results and experiences at
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the by-elections o£ 1910 to 1914 (Hanley in particular ) proved
the decisive catalysts in moving the miners towards Labour .
The Liberals re£used to accept mining candidates and this
along with the changing composition o£ the MFGB leadership
(Smillie, an I . LP.P.er became the leader in 1911), insured the
miners' support £or independent Labour representation.

As

yet, this support was patchy, but certainly evident in N.
Sta££ordshire, Ashton, Durham, and Mid-Derbyshire. 43
The last area o£ organizational growth dealt with trade
councils .

These industrial groups had not taken their poli-

tical duties seriously be£ore 1910.

MacDonald's assistant

J.S. Middleton verbalized a new view o£ these bodies shared
by the N.E.C. when he commented that "we at the Head O££ice
realise to the £ull what oocrellent service the Councils were
able to render us in the early years.

As the political side

o£ the movement has developed however, it is extremely desirable that these bodies (Local L.R.C.s) should be our points
of local contact.,,44Thus , a££iliation was in large part trans £erred £rom the trade councils to purely political organs.
By 1914, a££iliation was held by political parties in London ,
Glasgow, Manchester, and Leeds.
had had a££iliated parties.
)

In 1910, none o£ these areas

By 1914, there had indeed been

a great deal o£ improvement within the Labour machine .

With

this in mind, it is important to examine the state o£ the
43McKibbin, pp. 26-27.
44Ibid ., p. 33·
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relationship between the Liberal and Labour Parties.
From 1910 to 1914, the Labour Party lost four seats at
by-elections.

In addition, P.F. Clarke has noted that in

fourteen three-cornered by-elections, Labour finished third. 4 5
Pease's threat to prevent any Labour growth seems to have
been realized in these results.

Yet,the result of these

electoral losses actually helped the Labour Party.

For this

Liberal antagonism seriously dampened their relationship with
Labour.

Though MacDonald was successful in maintaining cor-

dial relations nationally with the Liberals, the rank and
file was slowly beginning to gain a stronger consciousness
of being part of the Labour Party.

The question of tracing

this consciousness to the growth of the worker discussed in
chapter one ia difficult, but was certainly important.

For

the purposes of this chapter, it will be sufficient to examine
the accidental causes of this consciousness.
The four by-election losses suffered by Labour before
the war were all actually quite peculiar.

Other than Bow

and Bromley (where George Lansbury fought the entire campaign
as an Independent on the votes for women question), all of
the losses occurred in mining constituencies in the Midlands
)

and served not only to alienate the traditionally Liberal
miners from the Liberal

Pa~ty

but also to confirm the belief

uf much of the rank and file that an alliance with the Liberals
45p.F. · Clarke.,. "The ElectGral Position of the Liberal
and Labour Parties.t. 1910-14", The English Historical Review
90 (October, 1975);Sj1 ;
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was not desirable .

Even af'ter the f'irst General Election of'

1910, it was bluntly stated that "The treatment meted out to

our candidates by the Liberals during the recent contest was
not of' a kind to predispose us towards any undue f'riendly
relationships . ,,46
In June of' 191 2 , Enoch Edwards, the president of' the
Miner's Federation and the Labour M.P. a t Hanley died.

Though

he was at heart a Liberal, Edwards had maintained a cordial
relationship with Labour.

With his death, the Liberals put

up their own dandidate shocking the entire Labour Party.

At

the same time, the Liberal M.P. at Crewe died, and in revenge
the Labour Party decided to f'ight that seat as well .

Labour,

as expected f'ared poorly at Hanley and xhe Liberals barely
w(')n.

RuT. T.hA T,Fth(,)llr ; nT.ArVAYlT.i

an important seat.

(')Yl

aT. r.rAwA 1 (')flT. thA T,; hAr::l l l=l

Af'ter t he by-elections were over, The

Times hoped that "it may be in the growing intractability of'
the Labour Party we are witnessing the beginning of' the end
of the coalition . ,,47

And the LabQ!!r. Leader gleef'ully exclaimed

that Hanley "means the death-blow of' Liberal-Labourism as a
national f'orce.,,48

Though these analyses were extreme, it

did seem as if' Hanley was symbolic of' a growing disgust with
accommddatr0rl-.

The res.ul ts of' the by-elections at Chesterf'ield

and N.E. Derbyshire exacerbated this f'eeling and killed LibLabism in many people ' s minds by World War I.
46Labour Party Conference (1910).
47McKibbin; p .
48 Ibid •

56 .
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The "Kenyon Aff'air" at Chesterf'ield dealt a serious blow
to Lib-Labism.

Barnet Kenyon was a traditional Lib-Laber who

was put f'orward by the Derbyshire miners as the Labour candi date f'or Chesterf'ield in August, 1913.

When Kenyon ref'used

to sign the party constitution, MacDonald and the MFGB ref'used
to endorsehhis candidacy.

Kenyon was elected and actually

agreed to accept the Labour whip.

However, in January , 1914,

Kenyon suddenly resigned f'rom the Labour Party and was roundly
condemned.

The Derbyshire miners, who had supported Kenyon

throughout his escapades, promised that the entire af'f'air
would~ not

be repeated.

The by-election in May, 1914 at N.E. Derbyshire was the
f'inal blow to Derbyshire Lib-Labism.

When the Lib-Lab M. P .

died, leaving a vacancy, the miners nominated a new man,
James Martin.

He was in reality a Liberal, but since the

Kenyon afair, he had been a loyal Labour supporter.

The

Liberals ref'used to support him and put up their own man .
The result was to give the Conservatives the seat.

Along

with the ef'f'ects of' the coal strikes of' 1912, the by-elections
served to unif'y the miners and bind them more closely with
the Labour Party.

Perhaps the most telling statement on the

nature of' Lib-Labism came in the midst of' the N.E. Derbyshire
)

by-election f'romMacDonald.himself' .

He said that the Liberals :

.•• did it at Hanley and won. It is the most expensive victory Liberalism has had within this generation. They have lost f'ive or six seats as a result
of' their actions (actually f'ourJ ... What impertinence! •.. We have the seat. The Labour Party is
going to grow . It is not going to accept its present strength as its f'inal strength. It is going
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to contest constituencies, where it has got a hold,
and the convenience of no party will deter us. 4 9
MacDonald's strong oratory was of course in the heat of an
election campaign and should not be considered to represent
a drastic turn-around in N.E.C. strategy.

Yet, it does show

the tensions that were beginning to surface during this period.
In other mining constituencies, the N.E.C. tried to maintain
Lib-Lab agreements .

Yet, the general rank and file was be-

ginning to tire of cooperation and strongly fought to challenge
accommodation.

The two examples of this were at the Leicester

and KeighlY by-elections of 1913.
Leicester was particularly sensitive because it was a
double constituency where MacDonald had one seat and the
Liberals the other.

When the Liberal died, the local Labour

Party decided to fight for the seat.

After much intrigue

and questionable tactics, MacDonald was ablee to secure the
removal of the Labour man.

Yet, the Executive's active inter-

ference sent shock waves through the local Leicester organization and the entire episode showed that a future pact with
the Liberals would be difficult to impose on the rank and file.
The difficulty of reconciling national politics with the
wishes of the rank and file was a serious problem.

MacDonald ' s

comments during the N. E. Derbyshire by-election revealed that
even he was beginning to have his doubts primarily because
of Liberal intransigence .
In late 191), KeighJJu came up for a by-election and
49McKibbin, pp. 61-62 .
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again the rank and file demanded a Labour candidate.
derson went to

Keigh~

Hen-

and was persuaded that the majority

of the members were strongly in support of this candidature .
Subsequently, the N.E.C. did give its approval.

The reasons

for this endorsement ranged from the desire to avotd another
Leicester and more importantly , as Clynes put it, to give
"proof of the independence and self-contained position of
the Party ~oth in the House of Commons and the country.,,5 0
Thus, by the outbreak of World War I, the self-restraint
which had characterized Lib-Labism before 1910 seemed to be
on the wane.

Whether or not the alliance itself had broken

down is doubtful.

Yet , the Liberal loyalties of much of the

rank and file had been seriously questioned.

As Ross McKibbin

has put it:
.•. the growing intractability of Labour was (not)
primarily ideological or even connected with specifically objectionable policies of the Liberal government. It is possible, though difficult to prove,
that the industrial disturbances of 1911 813 contributed to militancy in the rank and file which, in
turn, made local parties less willing to stand aside
for Liberal candidates. Yet this was perhaps less
fundamental than a growing feeling in the country
that the Liberal Party was no longer the party of
the working classes, but that
the Labour Party
was. 51
'00

Conclusion
The period between the Memorial Hall Conference and Sara j evo saw the growth of the Labour Party from childhood to
50McKibbin, p. 69 .
)

51Ibid. , pp. 71

0
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adolescence .

The childhood can be construed as occurring

£rom 1900 to 1910 and the adolescence £rom 1910 to 1914 .

The

pro,l!>lems o£ the early Labour Party , coherence, control , and
independence had £or the most part reached a critical juncture
by 1914.

The problem o£ coherence was solved by not £acing

the issue o£ ideology at all.

As the trade unions numerically

exerted more and more in£luence on the party, the N.E.C. was
able to transcend the di££iculties o£ the alliance £orged in
1900 through the tactic o£ ambiguity .
The problem o£ control had been acute be£ore 1910 most
clearly illustrated in Ben Tillett's resolution o£ 1905 and
the challenge o£ Victor Grayson.

The N.E.C. was able to solve

these problems through shrewd manipulation and the general
consolidation o£ its power through the use o£ aid £or local
parties, the trans£erral o£ a££iliation £rom trade councils
to local L.R . C.s, the establishment o£ central parties in
Glasgow and London, and the setting up o£ regional organization in Scotland.

Thoggh Leicester was an example o£ continual

dissatis£action with the N.E.C . , there is no doubt that Mac Donald and Henderson were able to wield e££ective control
a£ter 1910.

The militant socialist element in the party was

in the minority and
)

t~e

.. het:erpgeneous nature o£ trade und.:on-

ism enabled the N.E.C. to keep most £actions o££ balance and
to thus control the party and its direction.
With regard to independence, it was evident that the

)

rank and £ile, spurred on by the militancy o£ the period, was
£ar more eager to break its ties with the Liberal Party than

)
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was the Executive .

The experiences at by-elections, " the

action of the Government over the railway strike and the
miners' strike",5 2 the delay in the reversal of the Osborne
Judgement, and the general antipathy towards the Liberals
after 1910 all served to demonstrate the need for independent
Labour representation.

Lib-Labism as it had been known in

the coal-fields and other prominent working class areas was
close to completely rupturing.

The N.E.C. reacted to this

growing disillusionment by trying to temper and control the
speed of such a fracture for politically expedient reasons.
An immediate break off would certainly deal a serious blow
to the party ' s fortunes.

Thus, the N.E.C. was certainly

moving more towards the rank and file, but was not ready to
completely abandon cooperation.
The position of the Labour Party by 1914 has been seen
by most commentators as one of weakness.

C ~ arke

has examined

the by-elections of 1910 to 1914 to show the abysmal condi tion of Labour at the national polls .

It is helpful to note

McKibbin ' s rebuttal to this argument .

Taking into account

the fact that the party was but ten years old and still operating under many handicaps, McKibbin has c.argued that the
best way to look at

Labo~r ' .~

performance is not to compare

the results too closely with the other parties.

Instead it

is more helpful to compare the by-election results where
possible with the 1910 General Election totals .
52McKibbin, p . 65 .

In these
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five seats (N.E. Lanarkshire, Holmfirth, Crewe, Keighl\y c and
Leith), Labour impvoved its total in all the constituencies .
Labour's entry cost the Liberal ' s seats in Crewe and Leith,
and their poll in Holmfirth and KeighlY was almost equal to
that of the Conservatives.

This argument at best only suggests

that though Labour did finish last, they were not doing abysmally.

In the seven seats contested for the first time in

by-elections, Labour's showing at Oldham , Midlothian, and
S. Lanark was good enough to give the Conservatives the gain .
Labour's poll at N.W. Durham , Houghton-Ie-Spring, and Keighl~
was remarkably good.
a Labour

imp~ovement

The Keighl~ by-election of 1913 showed
from 1911.

Though these results do not

reveal the triumph of Labour, they do suggest some severe
Liberal difficulty because of Labour. 53
From the standpoint of organization growth , George Askwith
noted that in the Labour Party, a "sense of greater strength
came, too, by the vast increase of membership in the unions
especially dealing with the semi-skilled and unskilled workpeople, as a result due partly to the systematic organisation ,
partly to the requirement of the National Insurarroee Act that
wage-earners should belong to an approved society.".54

In

addition, the payment of M.P.s and the Trades Union Act of
1913 greatly reduced the financial burden on the party which
was reflected in the appointment of national organizers, the
)

.53McKibbin, p. 29 .
54Askwi th, p. 355 .'

82
extension of the Head Office, and the beginning of financial
aid to local parties.

The relationship between the TUC a nd

the party generally improved in the period as well.

In 1913,

a Joint Board was established so that the TUC, the General
Federation of Trade Unions, and the Labour Party would meet
in the same building to better coordinate united political
action. 55

Also in 1913, the TUC passed with only three dissents,

a resolutio·n in favor of financial aid for the Labour Party
in response to the requirements of the Trades Union Act which
allowed a union to "contract-out" if it wished.

The effects

of the mining by-elections aided union support.

The MFGB under

Smillie became one of the party's loyalist and strongest supporters.

Perhaps even more helpful in establishing a greater

rapport between the unions and the party was the effect of
the industrial disturbances of the period.
In his history of Industrial Problems and Disputes, Lord
Askwith noted "the inter· ference of politicians in Labour
disputes, much as many of them hankered to come in, was r: dele terious, and could be exposed far more strongly than I have
suggested. ,,56

This comment was in particular :cweferring to

the London Dock strike of 1912 when .:five cabinet minsters
attempted to settle the dispute and ended up antagonizing
both sides.

In one of the many transport strikes of the

period, Lloyd George successfully appealed to the Agadir
imbroglio as a

t'IAI;'OC')

~....

unity to end the strike} alienating

55 TUC Annual Report (1913) .
56Askwith, p. 353.
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many workers .

In response to the miner's Minimum Wage Act

of 1912 , Asquith tersely referred to the Act as "A provisional
and, t o some extent, as an experimental measure to meet a
special emergency in regard to a particular class of workers
working under peculiar conditions in one great industry."57
This was certainly not the statement of a "New Liberal".

The

most inflammatory gesture was the government's use and threat
of police and military in the industrial disputes.

In re-

ferring to Churchill and the government's actions during the
S. Wales Miner's Strike and the London Transport Worker's
Strike, Ben Tillett called Churchill a "modern Nero".

He

went on to say that the "suppression by violence of our good
fellows in all of the port fights ... (is) terrible enough as
a handicap for even a Tory Government; but for one who is a
Liberal ... it is indeed an impeachment to recall the miserable episodes of the fight where Labour had the millstone of
capitalist repression a bout its neck."58

Even MacDonald con-

demned the government for threatening military action in the
summer of 1911.59

Thus, by 1914, because of greater organ-

ization, the actions of the government, and a growing working
class consciousness, it is safe to say that the relationship
between the unions and the Labour Party, though not ideal ,
was becoming increasingly closer and harmonious .
57The Times, 3 November 1913 .
58Tillett, p. 34.
59Hansard, August, 1911 .
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The last area to examine is where Lib-Labism stood by
1914 .

Since early 1910, the Liberals (the Master of Elibank

in particular) had approached MacDonald many times to discuss
the possibility of forming a coalition.

Typical of these

gestures was a letter from Lloyd George to MacDonald on March

3, 1913 ·
My dear Ramsay,
I want to have a serious talk with you about
the relations of Liberalism and Labour. If we go
on as we have been doing during the last couple of
years more especially, both your Party and ours will
meet with the worst disaster which has be~allen us. 60
In 1912, Elibank asked MacDonald if he would "not join the
cabinet"?

MacDonald's reply was "that it was out of the

question for two reasons.

1.

I was not prepared to support

the Govt . through thick and thin.
to the Labour Party.,,61

2.

It would do great evil

It is difficult to go too far in

estimating the finality of MacDonald's intentions .

Yet , his

speech during the N.E. Derbyshire by-election was quite strong
and after Labour had revenged their loss by fighting at Ipswich
( causing a Conservative gain), he noted on May 29th that :
The Conservatives will ... continue their attempts
to get a Parliamentary majority on minority votes,
and if the Liberals ask us to prevent that by giving
them every seat they want, the Conservatives will
succeed, for we will agree to no such proposal. If
the Liberals run candidates against us they can do
so, and when that policy of stupidity has ended in
devastation we will ask them how it pleases them.
If that should come we shall @egin to build up again
with the knowledge that we shall be in a far better
position than the Liberals themselves to make good
60Marquand, p . 159 .
61Ibid., 151 .
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our losses, and that in this country , as on the
continent, the fight ~ .• will then be between a great
Labour Party and a strong reactionary party, with
a small Liberal Party standing between, cut off
from every source of inspiration and opportunity of
growth. 62
.
Thus , at the Executive level, the question of continued cooperation was seriously being questioned.

MacDonald and Hen-

derson were the most open of the N.E.C. towards a s renewal of
a pact .

But even MacDonald seems to be speaking with more

confidence and militancy by the outbreak of the Great War.
While it is difficult to make any national prognosis, it is
easy to see a general disaffection at the local level .

For

a variety of reasons which will be seen in the next chapter ,
the rank and file would not react favora@ly to any further
accommodation.
Thus, the Labour Party throughout the period continued
to gain momentum.

When it was a lesser force before 1910,

it was naturally easier to gain concessions from the Liberal
Party .
191~,

Yet, as the party grew in numbers and power through
opposition stiffened .

The amazing results of 1906 were

not duplicated or built on before the war.

But it should

not be expected that a young party which was growing asa
threat to the Liberals should be allowed to expand.

Consi -

dering this, the electoral results after 1910 should not be
viewed as poor showings.

Rather, it was remarkable that

Labour fared as well as it did.

The institutionalization

of the Labour Party in 190J ( revealed in 1906) became more
62Marquand, p. 162 .
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and more ingrained within the workingman ' s mind .

Habits be -

gan to form in areas where the party was allowed to grow and
the events of 1910 to 1914 served to reinforce these trends
with an added vigor.

By 1914 it was impossible to say whether
,

,

'
'

'

or not Labour would succeed Liberalism. ' ' However, it is possible to say, from the result of the by-elections alone, that
Labour had become a real threat to the Liberals .

Though the

Liberal and Labour Parties did not differ ideologically, their
membership and motives were radically different.

The growing

disenchantment of the working class and their own conservative rank and file would prove to be the Liberal's greatest
challenge .

How they would handle it is unfortunately unknown ,

for after August 1914, came the deluge ; swamping Europe and
drowning the Liberal Party .

,)

CRliPTER III
Patterns of Disenchantment
To reduce the Liberal Party to a definition would
be like attempting to reduce the glandular contours
of a circus Fat Lady by simply talking her thin.
It was an irrational mixture of whig aristocrats,
industrialists, dissenters, reformers, trade unionists, quacks and Mr. Lloyd George.
(George Dangerfield, Strange Death, p . 72)

The National Picture
After their victory in the December election of 1910 ,
or.\"l

the Liberals became· the s-..~

party in English history to

win three successive General Elections .
Conservative Party was indeed bleak.

The position of the

After the December

election, the Unionists were badly split.

At Albert Hall ,

the leader of the Conservative Party Arthur Balfour ruptured
the fragile unity that had only been maintained by party wide opposition to the "People ' s Budget ".

By coming out

strongly for Tariff Reform, it was "no longer possible or
desirable to ignore the gravity of the situation which the
Unionist Party has drifted in the past fortnight. ,,1

The lea -

J

dership waS discredited and after losing a third consecutive
General Election, the Liberal leadership felt that the position
l Blewett, p . 20J .
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of the Tories had never been worse . 2

Thus, from the perspec -

tive of 1910, it was the Conservative and not the Liberal
Party which appeared to be on its deathbed.
After the passage of the Parliament Act in 1911, the
Liberal Party was forced to repay the Irish Nationalists for
their strong support throughout 1909 and 1910.

Irish Home

Rule , the issue that had consumed the Liberal Party in the
last part of the nineteenth century once again raised its
menacing head after the summer of 1911.

The Nationalists

held eighty-four seats in the Parliament of 1911.

With the

Liberals holding 272 seats to the Unionists 271, the importance of the Nationalists becomes apparent.

It was critical

not to alienate the Irish during this period of utmost importance in constitutional and social history.

For this reason,

Home Rule was proceeded with leading to many unsettling events.
In Ireland, Carson's Ulstermen threatened Civil War.

To a

badly divided Unionis t Party, the Irish imbroglio offered an
issue.

Yet, the actions of F.E. Smith and Bonar Law seemed

seditious and split the Conservatives even further.
Liberal Party was in a quandary.

The

Could war in Ireland be

risked or should some type of compromise be attempted which
might anger Redmond and topple the government'?
The period 1910 to 1914 must be viewed in this context .
The position of both the Conservatives and Nationalists was
much more doubtful and elicited far more concern than the
position of the Labour Party .
2Blewett , p. 201.

To most informed observers of
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the day, the containment of Labour in 1910 and the pressing
constitutional issues of the day seemed to suggest the probability of further Labour cooperation.
Party was indeed

G~pendent

Though the Liberal

on Labour and Irish support, the

threat posed by Labour was not considered to be serious.

In

fact, the Liberal Party seemed to have quelled the rising
tide of working class consciousness by absorbing it.J

With

this background in mind, it is necessary to examine the speci fic condition of the Liberal Party from 1910 to 1914.

For

it will be argued, that the immediate crises of the day were
far less sign.ificant for the future of the Liberal Party than
the potentially catastrophic possibilities engendered by
continually deteriorating relations with the Labour Party.
From 1910 to 1914, the Liberal Party suffered fifteen
by-election losses to the Conservative Party.

Of those fif-

teen losses, eight can be attributed to the intervention of
the Labour Party and another to the Liberal-Labour split.
An examination of several of these by-elections will help
illuminate the condition of the Liberal Party during these
years.
The Liberal losses of Cheltenham and S. Somerset in
early 1911, while not critical in themselves, did reveal the
deficiencies of Liberal organization in rural areas .

Though

these constituencies had been marginal mainly because of the
free trade issue, they seemed to be representative of the
JS ee P.F. Clarke, Lancashire ---and the New Liberalism.
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decay of the Liberal machine in the south .4

The loss of

Oldham in 1911 was one of the most troubling signs of Liberal Labour problems .

In a town which was fought for the first

time by Labour, the result saw 12,255 votes cast for the
Unionists, 10,623 for the Liberals, and an astounding 7 , 448
for the Labour Party . 5

MacDonald noted in his diary that

the "Liberals (were) very angry about Oldham.

Long inter-

view with Elibank who says Premier very much upset . ,, 6 .
The losses of Manchester South and Manchester Northwest
within a few months of each other in 1912 were primarily due
to the reaction against the National Health Insurance Act of
1911.

These losses were indeed

ominou~

as Manchester as of

1910 had appeared to be the center of the revival of Liberalism
in the Northwest. 7

Both of these constituencies were mainly

middle-class and business oriented , and their loss was symbolic of the growing discontent of the traditional adherents
of Liberalism.

The Liberals lost Crewe in July of 1912 as

"the Labour revolt let in the Unionist. ,, 8

Crewe, which was

normally a safe Liberal seat, was beginning to typify the
destructive results of local intransigence to both Liberal
4Blewett, p. 282 .
5The Times, 14 November 1911.
6Marquand, p. 142 .
7Henry Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections:
188.5-1910 (London: . MacMillan, 1967), p. 282 .
8The Annual Register (1912), p. 192 .
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and Labour Parties . 9

Perhaps even more damaging was the loss

oi' Edinburgh to the Conservatives.

A traditional home of

the Liberals, the Midlothian stronghold had not been lost in
thirty-eight years. lO

The entrance of Labour certainly hurt

the Liberals as the vote went 6,021 cast for the Unionists ,
5,989 i'or the Liberals, and 2,400 i'or Labour.

The Annual

Regfuster sheds further light on this contest.

Mr. Outhwaite ,

the new Liberal M.P. from Hanley, "declared that landowners
should be taxed out oi' existence and the Whigs expelled i'rom
the Liberal Party."l l

This comment reveals a clear potential

for a cleavage between the 'new' Liberals and the traditional
wealthy contributors to the party.
The loss of Reading on November 8 , 1913 cam e in the midst
of extreme tensions over Home Rule.
being prosecuted at the time.

The lunatic Larkin was

At the Linlithgow by-election

which occurred simultaneously , Labour leaders advised working men to vote Conservative .

The result was a reduction of over

1,000 votes from the General Election and a hair-thin win by
the Liberals.

This slirr victory was made even more remarkable
by the presence of a large Irish Nationalist vote. 12 The
Socialist intervention at Reading cost the Liberals the seat
and is a clear example of the growing willingness of Labour
9Pelling, Geography, p. 282 .
10The
Times,
--- - 10 September 1912.
1iThe Annual Register (1 912 ), p . 206.
i2Ibid. (1913), p . 227 .
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rank and file to ;-idefeat the government.

The appearance for

the first time of a Labour candidate in S. Iianarkshire saw a
surprisingly strong performance and caused a Liberal 10ss.13
With the defection of Bethnal Green in London to the
Conservative ranks in February of 1914, the 8severity of the
Liberal-Labour split became evident.

Masterman, who had

just entered the cabinet, was defeated by twenty-four votes
because of Labour infiltration. 14 Bethnal Green was one eof
the last __~w in London which had remained Liberal during
a disastrous decay in the capital .

Leith Burgs, a constit-

uency which had "been faithful to Liberalism since the passing
of the Reform Act of 18)2 and [was) regarded by the Government as safe" followed suit in the continuing Liberal-Labour
split. 15

The vote showed 5,159 for the Unionists, 5,143 for

the Liberals, and 3,)46 for Labour.

Not only had Labour cost

the government another seat, but the campaign had been marked
by strong anti-Labour speeches by the Liberal candidate.
The N.E. Derbyshire by-election of May 20, 1914 has already
been discussed.

The final turnover came three days later at

Ipswich when Masterman was again defeated because of Labour
intervention.

The peak of acrimony that had been reached

by this date has been documented in MacDonald's strong oratory. 16
)

Thus, this rapid overview of by-elections has revealed three
1)The Tim~1 February, 1914.
14Ibid., 25 February 1914.

15:tft\J. ~ f~. ~ '(U~~

l"~ ~rr) p.~~.
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fundamental challenges to the future of the Liberal Party .
These three problems can be stated in the following terms.
1 ) The decay of the Liberal machinery in certain
parts of the United Kingdom.
2) The difficulty of retaining middle-class support
while at the same time appealing to working class
voters.

3)

The increasingly dire condition of the so-called
"progressive coalition" between the Liberal and Labour Party by the outbreak of World War I.
Before examining these three proposition, several clarifications are in order.

The alleged problems in Liberal

organization were by no means new.

Man~

of the difficul -

ties that will be discussed had plagued the party well before
the turn of the century.

In fact, there had been many attempts

to remedy these deficiencies.

The difficulty of retaining

middle-class backing was also not new.

The Liberal Party

had been willing to shed its right wing before (1886).

Lloyd

George's desire to ria the party of its more conservative
adherents was not peculiar to the period in question.

What

was new was the increasingly deteriorating relationship between the Liberal and Labour Party.

The reason for examining

the first two problems is that they both tended to exacerbate Lib-Lab relations.

Yet, the

disint~ gration

in progressi -

vism also affected the problems with organization and maintaining traditional Liberal supporters.

All three areas must

be critically examined in order to properly evaluate the ac tual political position of the Liberal Party as of 1914.
Finally, by-elections are not General Elections.

Though they

are helpful in isolating certain trends, by-elections do not

present the same circumstances as General Elections.

The two

are fought in a different climate and have different rules of
the game.

Yet, by-elections do provide some insight into

certain trends which are important and not hidden by the
expediencies of General Elections.
The first proposition is at best tenuous, and at worst
impossible to prove because of the difficulty of the hypothesizing connected with ignoring the Great War.

Whether

or not these deficiencies had become permanent prior to 1914
is impossible to say.

Yet, it can be established, from three

regional studies, that there were some concrete problems
within the Liberal machine.

The most obvious example was in

London and the Southeast in general.

This area had been

lost to the Liberals since before 1900.

Though the decay in

the capital was an old story, it did reveal some of the problems the party had not solved before the war.

Paul Thompson ' s

Socialists, Liberals, and Labour clearly reveals the dilapidated condition of constituency organization.

Other than in

the more well-to-do suburban areas, there was little money for
active canvassing for registration.

In fact, most canvassers

had to be brought in from out of the constituencies to do
the work as most working class areas were unable to provide
enough workers at elections. 17

The results were obvious.

Except for 1906, an anomalous election, the results in London
and the Southeast proved disastrous.

Most Liberal voting in

17Paul Thompson, .Socialists, Liberals, and Labour (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 176-77·
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1910 seems to have come from the middle - class and not workingmen.

Thus, Thompson claims that the Liberals in London amounted

to little more than a party of interests without a creed and
lacking the firm support of the working class in a period
when politics were becoming more and more class- oariented. 18
According to Kenneth O. Morgan, the situation in Wales
was as potentially serious as in London .

Morgan claims that

Wales remained Liberal until the war solely because of the
strong pull of its traditional radical past.
at the constituency level was crumbling.

Party machinery

The major examples

of this occurred in Merthyr, Rhondda, and Glamorgan . 19

The

I.L.P. began slowly to penetrate Wales before the war.

As

religion began to decline as a focal point and economic issues
became increasingly pressing , the political situation in
Wales was slowly transformed . 20

Thus, the challenge to Li -

beralism was to reinvigorate a political machine which was
successful only because of its historic grip on the region
and not because of its efficiency .
Though it is difficult to go very much further in this
study of organization, it is necessary to point out a few
other problems.

The financial backing of the Liberal Party

had historically come from middle-class Nonconformists and
18Thompson, p. 176 .
19Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics 1868-1922
( Cardiff, S. Wales: University of Wales Press, 19b3), pp. 243-46 .
20Cyril Parry, "Gwynedd Politics, 1900-1920: The Rise
of the Labour Party," Welsh History Review 6 (June, 197.3) ·
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free traders .

Before 1906 , one of the major prerequisites

for a potential candidate was his ability to foot most of
his own expenses.

In Lancashire and the

New Liberalism, P .F .

Clarke asserts that this situation began to change as the
Liberal Party became more dependent on working class votes .
The burden of electoral expenses began to fall even more
heavily on the Chief Whip.

The Liberals had attempted a na-

tional fund drive for many small subscriptions (c. 1901) which
had failed .
depend on.

A few large donors had always been easier to
The Manchester Guardian asked "what would be the

state of the Liberal Party chest if it depended on the voluntary subscriptions of the rank and file?"21

Loreburn felt

that t he organization was "kept going solely by the sale of
honours . ,,22
Between 1908 and 1911, the NLF (National Liberal Federation) reorganized its national organization to meet the
needs of the new political situation.

Regional Districts

were established to insure greater centralization and cohe sion .

In areas such as Manchester and Oldham, this strate-

gy paid off as these locales became supportive of the national
policy of progressivism.

Yet, before 1914, these two towns

were more the exception than the rule.
)

Cecil Beck, a Liberal

organizer claimed that the party lacked "co-ordination and
planning. ,,23

There was an enormous amount of friction be-

21Clarke, Lancashire, p. 216 .

22Ibid .

23v.H .. Emy, Liberals , Radicals and Social: Politics
( Cambridge : C.U . P ., 1 973 ), pp. 285-87.

)
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tween the constituencies and whips.

The Liberal Party had

adapted ideologically and structurally to a new situation .
Yet, the party itself had changed little .

The continued

reliance on a few large donors evidenced the fact that old
practices were continuing.

In comparison, the Labour Party ' s

organization was becoming more and more based on the trade
unions.

Fabian and I.L.P. influence had been greatly dimi-

nished by 1914.

This held no small importance for the future .

The working c mass was directly responsible for the running
of its party and local and national coordination, while not
perfect, was steadily improving through 1914.

Meanwhile, the

"New Liberal Party" which was to appeal to working class :i7o:t es for
a 'f'8 new base of support , gave little control to its new constituency.
The second proposition naturally followsfrom the first .
If a "new Liberalism" was evolving, how would the more conservative wing of the party react?

There is little doubt that

several conservative members left the party after 1909.
:rol'Mtoo~

After

the"election of 1910 , Lewis Harcourt "found allover the
country that all LLloyd George's speeches and Winston's earlier ones ... had done us much harm with advanced men of the
lower middle-class ... and probably account for the heavy losses
in the south.,,24

Herbert Samuel summed up the true challenge.

The debacle in the Home Counties and in so many
agricultural divisions is lamentable. It is the
abiding problem of Liberal statesmanship to rouse
the enthusiasm of the working classes without frigh 24 Emy , p . 236 .
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tening the middle classes. It can be done but it
has not been done this time. 2 5
There was a significant turnover of the more "whiggish" element in the party.26

Though until 1914 the actual degree of

division was minimal, there was a hard-core group of conservative Liberals who consistently abstained on the major social issues of the day.27

The relative lack of dissent can

be accounted for when one realizes the precarious position
the government was in from 1910 to 1914.

Dependence on the

Irish and Labour has been noted at''''ld voting against the government could conceivably bring it down.

In a sense, both the

Labour Party and the conservative Liberals were in a similar
predicament as they both shared the fate of having their
hands tied.

Though this was true at the parliamentary level,

it was not necessarily valid locally.

The classic example

of this was in the West Riding in Yorkshire where Liberalism
and Nonconformity happened to be the outlook of the large
employers of labour. 28

The most obvious case was at Bradford

where Alfred Illingworth tenaciously clung to his local power .
The results of this were seen in the remarkable growth of the
25Emy , p. 236 .
26The loss of middle-class support however does not dictate a loss in money. Wealthy donors could continue to seek
honours and contribute to the party coffers regardless of
actual ideology or faith in the party. See Lloyd George ' s
slush fund and the state of Liberal finances after 1920.
27Nancy Thompson, "The New Liberalism: 1906-1914: An
Analys.is of its Impact upon British Politics, Policies and
People: "(Honors Thesis, Oberlin College , 1978) .
28Glaser, "Nonconformity", p . 354.
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I.L. P . after 1890. 29
The third proposition was the most serious challenge to
the future of Liberalism.

The relationship with the Labour

Party had been defined by the nature of the 1903 pact.

Li-

beralism was able to steer much of the new working class consciousness into its camp through this pact . 30

From the per-

spective of 1910, it can be as easily argued that the pact
helped the Liberals more than it helped the Labour Party as
compared to the opposite and usual interpretation.

We have

already viewed the condition of Lib-Labism from the Labour
vantage point.

From the Liberal perspective, the experiences

with Labour from 1910 to 1914 were more ominous than most
contemporaries acknowledged.

The loss of parliamentary seats

because of Labour intervention and their remarkably strong
po ll in many of these areas was quite alarming.

In the months

immediately before the war, the Liberal leadership finally
began to vocalize some concern over the breakdown of the pro gressive coalition.

On April 4, 1914, Asquith admitted that

all of the government ' s losses at by-elections in the previous
two years ( except for Reading-which was lost because of Socialist intervention and not by official N.E.C. instructions)
were due to the "split in the forces of progressivism. "

It

was indeed a pity that the "democratic army (was) split assun der in the face of the common

enemy. lI ~

In June, Lloyd George

29J. Reynolds and K. Laybourn, "The Eniergence of the Independent Labour Party in Bradford", International Review of
So'cia}: History 20 (1975), p. 331.
3 0Thompson , p . 295.
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stated that the "disunion in our own ranks ( alluding to LibLab relations) " was "the great rock in f'rontof' us (Liberals). "3'.
Of' course a word should be said f'or progressivism.

P.F.

Clarke has identified certain important attitudes that many
"New Liberals" held.

C.P. Scott and the Guardian

to f'orge a progressive coalition in Manchester.
cessf'ul in the General Election of' 1910.

attempted
This was suc -

Wigan and Oldham

were two other examples of successful Lancashire progressivism .
However, Clarke ' s conclusions are for the most part gross
generalizations which are more true for radical leaders than
the Liberr-al Party as a whole .

Just because a "New Liberalism "

was espoused did not mean it would be accepted.
The national condition of the Liberal Party in 1914 was
a t best questionable.

The f'irst two problems could be reme-

died and f'rom the perspective of Westminster seemed trivial
in view of the upheavals of' the period and compared with the
apparent dif'ficulties of' the Unionis t camp.

The last propo-

sition was f'ar more serious and yet, once again f'rom a national
s t and point, appeared less dangerous:::; than it actually was .
The problems::: that have been isolated are of' course magnif'ied
at the local level.

Not only were tensions in organization,

composi tion, and cooperation obvious, but these probbi!IDS were
actually translated into the electoral situation.

Thus, it

become!3 necessary to turn our attention to the dif·f icul t,
e l usive, and for the most part untouched topic of local politics .
31Martin Petter, "The Progressive Alliance ", History 58
( February, 1973), p . 57·
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The Local Situation
The area of Municipal Elections presents an intriguing
challenge to the political historian.

These elections gave

the Labour Party an opportunity to contest areas free from
the constraints of parliamentary contests.

For this reason,

these elections were taken very seriously and gave local
organs the chance to put their machines to the test.

Since

the power of Head Office was not normally able to reach this
level of politics, constituency organizations were more eager
to nominate candidates. 32
Before examining some results, it is imperative to make
certain explanations and essential qualifications about the
nature of local politics.
politics through a

Municipal Elections are not national

looking-glass ~

The way the electorate

voted in these contests does not provide definitive answers
to national political questions.

It was only now that these

elections came to be fought along party lines.

These contests

were not always fought on polit ic al issues either.

The func -

tion $ £ these elections was to elect municipal councils.

The

two majO'r areas of business for the councils were public
health and education.
"Municipal Corporations are governed by councils consis ting of the mayor, aldermen, and councillors . ,,33
elected only the councillors.

The mayor and aldermen were

3 2Mckibbin, pp. 84-85.
33 The Municipal Yearbook (1913), p. 7·
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selected by and from these officials .
for election every three years.

A councillor came up

To be qualified to vote in

local elections one had to be a burgess.

Burgesses were per-

sons of "full age who have been resident in or within seven
miles of the borough during a period of twelve months preceding 15th July, are rated to the poor rate and have paid poor
and borough rates due by a certain date. ,,34

An alternative

qualification was to be a ten-pound occupation burgess.

In

both cases, there was a necessary property qualification.
The result of these laws was to restrict the franchise even
more s everely than in national elections.

Thus, the major

factor to consider in evaluating local elections was the nature
of the franchise.

Nowhere in the United Kingdom was this

figure over 20% of the adult population.
were:

In 1911, the figures

Leicester, 1 9. 6%; Sheffield, 18. 5%; Manchester, 17.1%;

Leeds, 19.7%; Bristol, 18.3%; Cardiff, 14.8%; and Swansea,
16.2%.35

The necessity of keeping these figures in mind when

analyzing the remarkable results of 1910 to 1914 must be emphasized.

Despite these low numbers, elections (which were

held annually at the beginning of

NovembellS'~o

were fairly vi-

gorouslyf:o(tlght with a turnout of almost 75% of eligib}le voters
in most municipalities .
Before evaluating the figures for the period, it is
appropriate to justify the study of local elections.

Despite

34 The Municipal Yearbook (1913), p·7 ·
35Chris Cook, The Age of Alignment (Toronto :
of Toronto Press , 1975), p. 49.
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the low franchise and peculiarities of municipal government ,
municipal elections did " ... unfold a pattern

of'

politics".3 6

These elections provided the Labour Party the essential opportunity of creating a habit of voting which was so critical
in British politics.

In examining local politics , the special

difficulties of the parliamentary situation are avoided and
the trends identified in the earlier part of this chapter
are seen in their full significance.

With these explanations

firmly in mind , i t is now possible to evaluate my limited
data .
In The Evolution of the Labour Party ,

Ross McKibbin gives

the following figures :
No. of
Year
Lab0ur Candidates
Elected
Gains
Losses
Net Gains
-23
122
32
1909
555
55
1910
113
52
19
330
33
17
1911
157
78
3~7
95
164
21
42
1912
596
63
106
21
494
196
1913
85
CONTESTS
HELD DUE TO WAR
12,14
NO
SOURCE: McKibbin, p. 85 and Labour Annual Report-1913.
What do these figures mean and where do they come from?

The

answers to both of these questions are not given by McKibbin.
The numbers can be found in the Report of the Labour Party's
Annual Conference.

The major problem with these figures is

that they do not go back to 1908 which was a disastrous year
for Labour and Liberal alike. 37

Therefore , the gains made

3 6p.J. Waller, from his review of Clarke's Lancashire,
in English Historical Review 87 (October, 1972), p. 845.
J7Chris Cook, "Labour and the Downfall of 'l~); ' Liberal1906-14", Crisis and Controversy (London: MacMillan
Press Ltd., 1976),p. 40.

ism. - ;./:
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in 1909 and 1910 only made up for the losses of that year .
Another difficulty with these figures is a comparison with
the only other total figures available in this country.

The

two sources in question are The Times (London) and G.D.H .
Cole ' s

~

History of the Labour Party from 1914.

The Times is the most intriguing and deceptive source .
The paper reports only gains and rather arbitrarily adds any
other information concerning the contests.

The major thing

to keep in mind about these results is that they were published
in an extremely Conservative paper which would exaggerate the
situation anytime the Liberals seemed to be lo g ing strength.
The complete results are in Appendix B.

For the purpose of

this paper, it is sufficient to note just a few things.
In 1910 according to The Times, the Liberals gained sixty seats, the Unionists gained forty-three, and the Labour
and Socialist Parties gained thirty-four seats.

A gain is

considered to be the winning of a particular seat that had
not been won in the previous election three years before.
These are not net gains.

Most of Labour's gains occurred in

the Northwest and the West Riding.

The most remarkable show-

ing was at Manchester where Labour gained six seats.

The

only other information given referred to the composition of
the West Ham council which showed fifteen Unionists, thirteen
Socialists, and eight Liberal members . 38

38 The Times, 2 Novemb er 1910 .
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In 1911, " the municipal elections showed large Liberal
and larger Labour successes ... ".39

The total gains were

Labour and Socialists, 56; Liberals, 52; and Unionists, 39.
Labour's major successes came in Bradford, 6; Liverpool, 6;
Birmingham, 6; Manchester, 2; South Shields, 3; and Leeds, 3.
Again most"gains occurred in the working class areas of the
North.

The Times sheds even more light on the situation when

examining the Unionists gains.

The Conservatives gained three

seats in Burnley and had "a majority on the council for the
first time in the history of the borough. ,,4o

Even more signi -

ficantly, it was noted that this occurred because of Labour
intervention.

The Unionists also had council majorities in

such traditional Liberal strongholds as Bury (Lancashire)
and Coventry.41

Another interesting phenomenon was the pre-

sence of a fusion party in (Gillingham), consisting of a
Liberal-Conservative party against Labour.

Despite this

coalition, Labour was able to secure two gains on the counfuil.
The gains in Liverpool (where there was also a fusion party42)
and Birmingham were particularly impressive not to mention
the fact that 1911 marked the first year that Labour gained
more seats than any other party in the country.
In 1912, the municipal results showed the following gains:
Liberal, thirty-six; Unionists, fifty-eight; and Labour a nd
39The Annual Register (1911), p. 238.
40The Times, 2 November 1911.
41Pelling, GeographY, pp. 190, 253, and 266.
42The Manchester Guardian, 2 November 1911.
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Socialists , twenty,.-seven .

The most notable Labour gains were

in Bradford, 4; and Southampton, 2.43

More significant were

the Unionist gains and where they occurred:

Bolton, 2; Burn-

ley, 2; Gillingham, 3; Huddersfield, 2; Leeds, 4; Manchester,
3;

w.

Ham, 3; Salford, 2; and Wolverhampton, 2.44

The Con-

servatives largest successes were in working classa areas.
The Gillingham result shows the effectiveness of fusion :
Liberal readiness to move to the political right.
local elections in London as well.

the

1912 saw

The following councils

were all in working class areas and reveal the position of
the parties after 191 2 .
Borough
Unionists
Deptford
17
Islington
54
Kensington
52
Lambeth
56
Poplar
29
21
Woolwich
SOURCE: The Times (1912).

Lib.
1
5
2
2
2
0

Lab. and Soc.

11
1
6
2
9
12

Out of all the constituencies, the Liberals held a majority
on but 3 councils; two of them by only one to three councillors .
The. totals for London showed Unionists, 1,002; Liberals , 252;
and Labour and Socialists, 48. 4 5
1913 was the culmination of Labour success.

"They (resul tsJ

showed an increase of the Labour stllE?ength" ... "and a consi derable loss of Liberal seats to Labour and Socialist candi 43The Times, 2 November 1912 .
;;

44 Ibid .
45Ibid.
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dates. ,,46

The f'ollowing results were reported by The Times:

Unionists, 52 gains and 51 losses ; Liberals , 34 gains and 40
losses; and Labour and Socialists , 51 gains and 15 10sses. 47
The Labour Party had netted more seats than any other party.
The most stunning successes occurred in Birmingham, 2; Bradf'ord, 3; Leeds, 3; Leigh, 2; Hull, 2; Middlesborough, 3; and
Stockton-on-Tees, 3.

Looking at the Unionists' success, the

results showed the most signif'icant gains to be in Halif'ax,
2; Oldham, 3; Salf'ord, 2; and York, 4.
gave the

Union~s

The victory at York

a clear majority af'ter a long period of'

deadlocks.
The other
Cole ' s work in

sou ~ ce

Histo~

that looks at

loca~

elections is G.D . H.

of' the Labour Party f'rom 1914.

From

I.L.P. sources, Cole (Like McKibbin) presents the f'ollowing
f'igures f'or 1913.

"494 Labour and

Socialist~' candida tes

were

put f'orward ... Of' these, 196 were elected , giving a gain of'
106 new seats as against twenty-one seats lost-a net gain of'
eighty-f'ive seats.,,48

In the same year, 353 Labour candidates

appeared at the District and Parish Council elections, and
of' these 196 were successf'ul-a net gain of' sixty-eight seats. 49
Cole calculates that there must have been about 420 Labour
representatives sitting on a variety of' municipal councils
by the outbreak of' World War I.50
46The Annual Register (1 913 ), p . 224.
47The Times, 3 November 1913.
48.G.D.H. Cole, ~ History of' the Labour Party f'rom 1914
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD., 1948), p. 445.
49Ibid.

5 0 Ibid . , p. 447 .
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What do these results mean?

In a general sense, they

do show the general growth o£ Labour around the country.

Yet ,

without getting more details it is di££icult to say much more.
Fortunately, Chris Cook has assembled data in his book Crisis
~nd

Controversy.

The Manchester Guardian also provides added

detail on the results .

Cook's

£ind~will

be analyzed £irst ,

£ollowed by a look at the Guardian's results.
I n his article "Labour and the Downf'all o£ Liberalism ",
Chris Cook asserts that after a period of large Liberal successes
at the municipal level (1902-05);
... the period a£ter 1906 had seen the Liberals not
merely on the de£ensive, but su£fering some severe
reverses. Thus in 1908, Liberals s ~ ££ered heavy
losses throughout Lancashire as well as losing control o£ She££ield, Nottingham, and Leicester in 1908 .
These were serious de£ections; Leicester had been
in radical control since 1835; Nottingham £or forty
years. They were joined by others; in 1909, Coventry
£ell to the Conservatives £or the £irst time in
twenty years. In 1911, Burnely was won by the Conservatives £or the £irst time in its history. In
1912, Liberals lo~t control o£ Brad£ord. In 1913,
the Conservatives wrested Hudders£ield £rom the
Liberals, the first time they had won control o£
this Nonconformist stronghold since the incorporation o£ the borough in 1868.51
One would naturallyy try to trace this Liberal decline to the
rise o£ Labour considering the aggregate results £rom The
Times and McKibbin.

This analysis unfortua ately will not

hold up under care£ul scrutiny.

One problem was the disaster

o£ 1908 , making the results £rom 1909 to 1914 less absolutely
signi£icant.
of Labour.

Another problem is the patchy and uneven march
In Birmingham , after six gains out of £ourteen

51Cook, p . 40.
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candidates in 1911, only one out of seven was successful the
next year, then four out of seven in 1913. 52

After six gains

in 1911 at Liverpool, none were successful in November of 1912 .
Rochdale and Sheffield provide similar parallels .

The following

table provides the most detailed sketch of the position of
the parties after 1913.
Town
Con
Norwich
33
20
Halifax
Oldham
14
Burnley
28
Barrow
18
Leeds
34
Sheffield
32
Northampton
17
Coventry
26
Nottingham
37
Bradford
32
Wolverhampton
25
Birmingham
87
York
24
SOURCE: Cook, p. 43.

Lib
25
24
22
29
5
18
30
14
16
25
31
17
25
16

Lab

""5
7
1
3
8
16
2
5
4
2
20
3
8
6

Oth
-11
1

1
1
3
2

This table sheds no light on the hypothesis which has Labour
ousting the Liberal Party before 1914.

In fact, many of

Labour's successes seem to have come at the expense of the
Conservatives in many areas.

Yet, that should be qualified

by the realization that a large sector of the working class
had been traditionally Tory.

Cook examined five cities to

examine the actual course of Labour growth.

A brief summary

of his findings is helpful.
Bradford had been an I .L. P . stronghold since the early
1890s.

After 1902, this strength was r eflected in the remar-

5 2 Asa Briggs , Histor~ of Birmingham, 2 vols. (London l
Oxford University Press, 1952), II:198-99 .
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kable growth of Labour on the council . 5 3
Year
1905
1906
1908
1912
1211

Con
31
34
42
35
22

Lib
42
38
30
31
11

Lab
10
11
10
17
20

Others
1
1
2
1
1

The following table shows the growth of the Labour vote in
Bradford .
Year
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913

Lib
34."6
26·3
31·3
32·7
30.2
31.4
33·6
26.0
29·7

Con
%.3
37.8
31·7
32·9
29·5
33·0
32.0
32.0
27.2

Lab
22.0
26.6
30·5
30.0
31.3
35.2
31.0
42.0
43.1

Others
2.0
9 ·2
6 .5
4 .5
9 ·2
.4
3 ·5

Indeed the Liberals were losing their support dir ectly to
the Labour Party. 54

The same kind of growth occurred in

Bradford ' s sister city of Leeds .
Year
1906
1907
190~'

1909
1910
1911
1912
1912

Coth n
21
28
36
34
31
26
34
24

Lib
J1}
26
23
23
26
28
23
18

Lab
9
10
4
6
6
10
11
16

Others
1
1
1

-

The Liberals not only lost seats to Labour but to Conservatives as a result of Labour intervention.

In three-cornered

contests, the Liberals were normally at the bottom of the
53Reynolds, p. 319 .
54 Cook, p. 46.
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poll .

In Sheffield, Labour fared dismally but this did stop

the decline of the Liberal Party there before 1914.

At Lei -

cester, the Liberals were faring poorly due mainly to poor
relations with the Labour Party ( See Chapter 2 !~ on the by election for 1913) .

Labour was in fact doing quite well

since they had the largest number of councillors returned in
contested elections. 55

Leicester was lost for the first time

since 1835 and there Lib-Labism had no meaning despite the
parliamentary situation (i.e. MacDonald).
Labour was doing poorly.

At Nottingham,

Yet their challenge to Liberalism

was such that the Conservatives were in firm control there
by 1913.

Cook also notes that Manchester was in Conservative

hands throughout the period.
The Manchester Guardian gives fairly detailed municipal
election results for these years.

Clarke ' s argument does

not hold up for Lancashire at the local level.

O~her

than

Wigan, Wakefield, Oldham, and Manchester (and there only from
1909 to 1911), Conservative-Liberal fusion was more the trend
than progressivism.

There were fusion parties in Liverpool ,

Halifax, Huddersfield, and Barrow.

In 1908 at Manchester,

a Conservative candidate was successful in attracting Liberal
votes by running as an Independent against Labour.56

In Barrow,

Leigh , and Salford, the Liberals were losing elections directly
to Labour.

The following table gives a further view of the

55Cook, p. 51.
5 6 The Manchester Guardian, 2 November 1908 .

11 2
general decline o£ Liberalism in the North .
Town
Hali£ax

Year
1906
1909
1911
1912
1913

Con

Lib

14
17
19
18
(20)

36
33
33
19
(24)

LIT

15

Lab
No Data
7
8
8
7
Includes Aldermen

Barrow

1908
1913

19
18

11
5

2
8

Leigh

1908
1909
1911
1912
1913

11
12
12
13
12

13
14
13
11
11

3
5
5
6

:z

In Barrow and Leigh , Labour was gaining most o£ its seats £rom
the Liberal Party.

The loss of Leigh in 1912 was significant

as it was the only safe Liberal seat in Northeast Lancashire. 57
Indeed, it was the first time that the Liberals had lost Leigh
in 13 years. 58

The precipitous deeay of Liberalism in Halifax

and Barrow was also significant.

The small town of Nelson

was a special case being the only council with an actual
Labour majority (despite Lib-Con fusion) in the area.59

The

Chesire division o£ Macclesfield witnessed a steady growth
in Labour representation despite joint opposition by the
Tories and a conservative Liberal Party.
1912, 5 gains were reported there.

Between 1910 and

Southampton and Bedford

are further examples of Labour expansion at the expense of
Liberalism. 60
57pelling, Geography, pp . 267-68 .
58 The Manchester Guardian, 3 November 1913 .
59Ibid., 2 November 1912.
60 The Times, 4 November 1913 , p . 5 ·
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The importance of the by-election results are m.: a;glified
locally.

In Wigan and Wakefield, a Lib-Lab alliance continued

with marked success supporting Clarke's argument.

From 1908

to 1913 in Wigan, the Liberal and Labour Parties had joined
in stunning successes, wresting the council from the Conservatives for the first time in many years. 61

But for the most

part, the tensions nationally were translated · to the local
level.

The most remarkable phenomenon was the growth of

fusion parties.

The Liberal Party was evidently faring so

poorly as to prefer a coalition with the Tories.

This impl ned

that the Liberals were not willing to work out locally a
policy of accommodation that the leaders of the national party
had forged.

The following is a partial list of those boroughs

where these fusion parties existed at one or more elections.
Halifax :·as t
East Ham
Poplar
Huddersfield
Liverpool
Barrow
Hammersmith
Nelso n
Glasgow
Bradford
SOURCES:

Leicester
North Kensington
Gillingham
Paddington
Croydon
Leigh
Nottingham
Leeds
She~field

Crewe
West Ham
Cook, The Times, Manchester Guardian, and Waller.

The growth of fusions seems to suggest that the "New Liberalism" had not been transferred to the const?t~ncy and local
level.

Further evidence for this conclusion can be drawn

from the rise in three-cornered contests in relatively strong
progressive areas.

1909 to 1911 marked the heyday of Manchester

61 The Manchester Guardian, 3 November 191J .
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progressivism .

After that period, there was at least one

three-cornered contest in that city until the war.
also saw an increase in triangular elections. 62

Oldham

With this

evidence as a stepping-stone , it easy to hypothesize respecting other Liberal problems . 63
The organizational problem alluded to earlier seems to
be borne out by Cook's findings.

In many areas (Leicester

for one), there was tremendous confusion between local Liberal
parties and the N.L.F. 64 The Liberals were without a programme
and without efficient machinery. 65

One of the significant

statistics which Cook has uncovered was the age and occupation of municipal candidates.

The Liberals were consistently

older than Labour candidates and for the most part from middle
and upper class ranks. 66 *

Leeds and Wolverhampton were two

examples of towns where Liberals refused to field working
class candidates. 67
62Cook, p. 42.
63It is interesting to note Cook ' s local findings for
the post-war era in The Age of Alignment. Labour successes
and Liberal failures were of course stimulated exponentially
by the war. Yet, the areas which had shown vulnerability before 1914 were the same as those which witnessed large Labour
gains and larger Liberal misfortunes in the early 1920s.
64Emy , p. 285 . and Cook, p. 62.
65 Ib id .
66 Cook , p. 61 .
*An interesting comparison to this local figure can be
found in Barbara Tuchman's The Proud Tower (New York: The Mac Millan Company, 1962). On page 369, she claims that of the
377 M.Ps elected for the Liberals in 1906, "154 .. were businessmen, 85 were barristers, 69 were Gentlemen, 25 were writers ... , 22 were officers and the remaining 22 included university professors, teachers, doctors and champions of causes ."
67Cook, p . 61 .
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The proposition that the Liberal Party was in a difficult
position because of the awkwardness of retaining their middle
class support while appealing to the working class can also
be tested at the local level.

Considering the disastrous

state of Liberal municipal politics, the marked revival of
Conservatism in these areas, the growth of fusion parties, the
patchy growth of Labour, and most importantly the low fran chise figure, it is possible to say that large segments of
the Liberal Party had defected to the Conservative camp by
1914. 6,fJ:: This conclusion interestingly substantiates Butler
and Stokes's findings in Political, ,Change in Britain.

They

attempted to find out where most Liberal support had gone
after 1930 and the death of the party as a political force.
It was significant that the vast majority of support had gone
to the Conservative and not the Labour Party.

In fact, the

flow of support from the Liberal Party was predominantly
middle-class. 69

Wi th these two facts in mind, " one might con-

sider the possibility of a "Center" Party forming, consisting
of the Unionists and the right-wing of the Liberal Party.
This seems to have been occurring at the local level.

It is

therefore possible to explain the decline of Liberalism locally despite the uneven (and in places dismal ) progress of

j)

68 This is not Cook's conclusion. Cook understates the
importance of fusion parties and claims that the decline of
Liberalism was a result of the renascence of muncipal conservatism. Cook reaches this conclusion for many reasons. The
major one being fear of overstating his remarkable findings.
69Butler and Stokes, pp . 168-69 .
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the Labour Party as a result of the low municipal franchise
figures.

Why this was not translated to the national situation

is explained by the unique constitutional challenges to Liberalism before W.W. I.

The evidence to support this hypo -

thesis is not sufficient to make a definitive statement.

But

the local studies that have been done (Bradford and Wolverhampton) seem to suggest that this conclusion was possible.
Bradford for example .had long been a Liberal stronghold.

But

with middle-class businessmen in control of the organization,
cordial relations with Labour seemed doubtful.

In fact, the

fusion party there coupled with the defection of the Illingworths strongly points to an electoral realignment occurring
in Bradford before 1914.70
Macclesfield as well. 71

This was also true of Crewe and

The examples of Leeds, Nottingham,

Sheffield, and Leicester provide striking correlations with
the results of the by-elections of 1911-14.

As with the

parliamentary contests, the Conservatives were making large
gains because of Labour intervention.
Conclusion
Research for this chapter has provided some new and exciting evidence on the fortunes of the Liberal Party before
1914.

Clearly the Liberal Party after 1910 was not as healthy

an institution as most recent commentators have suggested.
However, the "inevitablist" camp can not take heart from this
7 0Reynolds, p. 31 9 .
71The Manchester Guardian, 4 November 1913·
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study either.

For if Liberalism was in decline before 1914

(as indeed this paper has shown), it was not because the Labour Party had superseded it.

The Liberal Party was having

difficulties because of its own inability to adapt to three
fundamental challenges .
The primary threat to the Liberal Party was its relation ship with the Labour Party.

Most Conservative periodicals

of the period 1910 to 1914 (Annual Register, The Times, and
Spectator to name a few) claimed the existence of a "Labour
revol t".

There was something of a Labour revolt during this

period but:, -;-h J c: rebellion was not confined to the Labour Party.

The Liberal Party at the constituency level was not par-

ticularly friendly towards Labour.

Containment was the rule

and many Liberal leaders had no intention of aiding Labour.
Just before the Hanley and Crewe by-elections of July 1912 ,
Riddell noted in his diary thatl
It is evident from what Lloyd George said today
that the fight between the Liberal and Labour Parties is pretty bitter. It is quite clear that the
Liberals would like to wipe out the Labour Party ,
and that failing this, they are anxious to keep
it 'in its place' .72
In discussing the specific by-elections, the great progressive
minister Lloyd George went on to say that "I would rather
see the Conservatives get in than the Labour man."7J

P.F .

Clarke's contention that there was a growing harmony between
the Liberals and Labour in Manchester is not backed up by
720hris Wrigley, David Lleyd George and the British Labour Movement ( New York: The Harvester Press-:-i976), p. 41i.
7Jlbid.
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the facts.

In a letter to the Spectator , it was claimed that

"The hitherto peaceful relations of Liberalism and Labour in
Manchester are at an end, and the "split" may show its effects
in more than one division of the city.,,7 4 The proof of this
was the Liberals' decision to bring forward their own candidate for E. Manchester to replace the Labour man.

"The new

development is an attempt on the part of Liberalism to ' get
its own back' .,,75

Though there was no election forthcoming

to bear this contention out, it was significant that at the
local level there were two three-cornered contests in 1913.
Salford and Oldham had triangular contests as well.

Clarke

himself notes disunity in Manchester locally between the

I.L.P. and Liberal Party.76

The growth of fusion parties is

of course the final proof of the bitter feelings between
Liberalism and Labour.

Thus . by 1914 the Liberal Party had

failed to reach a modus vivendi with Labour and the results
of this destructive poli ey were seen in the by-election and
municipal election results .
The challenge embodied by Harcourt and Samuel ' s concerns
after the 1910 elections is more difficult to gauge because
of the lack of local research done and because of the "whiggish"
members'care not to bring down the government during the constitutional crises of 1911-14.

Yet, the example of Bradford ,

Outhwaite's outburst at Midlothian, and the lack of Liberal
74Spectator, 30 August 1913 , p . 310.
75Ibid.
7 6Clarke , Lancashire , p. 165 ·
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working class candidates all point to the Liberals ' failure
to reconcile (if this was even possible) many members of the
party with the "New Liberalism " .

The most striking example

of this phenomenon occurred at Halifax.

This constituency

had been one of the areas covered by Lib-Lab agreements at
the parliamentary level.

Yet, at the local level, there was

strangely enough a Conservative-Liberal fusion party.77 The
"New Liberals " were increasingly becoming the leaders of the
parliamentary party and their ideology was in the vanguard
by 1914.

Yet , it is not clear whether this new intellectual

outlook had truly permeated the party.

After the loss of

Leith-Burgs in the by-election of 1914, J.M. Hogge wrote
Lloyd George that "The older generation of Scotsmen have been
bred in Radicalism, but there is growing up a large industrial
element, the component parts of which are for practical purposes unknown to the official party. ,,78

The results of the

by-elections in Manchester in 1912 point to this unresolved
dichotomy of the new and old Liberal.

By 1914, "the 'New

Liberalism ', for all of its achievements , had not brought
into being a new Liberal Party. "39

Much of the Liberal Party

could agree with Asquith when he said "I do not come here to
preach a new gospel.

The old gospel is good enough for me

and I believe for you also.,,80
77The Manchester Guardian, 2 November 1908 .
78 Emy, p. 288.
79Petter , p. 59.
80Cross, p. 66.
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The last challenge to Liberalism was posed by the necessity of a new style of organization engendered by the new poli tical situation in England that began in the period 1900-10 .
It has been argued that Clarke's claim that the reorganization of the Liberal Party in Manchester had occurred under
the pressure of progressive politics is at best improbable .
This can be shown by just a brie·f look at the political machinery of the Labour a nd Conservative Parties.
The Labour Party has a ready made organization of
an almost perfect character in the Trade Unions.
It deals very largely with everyday facts relevant
to the lives of its supporters and easily understood by them. Its real work is done, as the work
of political conversion must be done, not on the
platform but in the workshop and the home. 81
The growing coordination between the N.E.C. and local parties
after 1911 was critical in making the Labour Party a viable
machine.

Yet, it should be equally noted that there was still

a very vocal minority that rema:ined autonomous and troublesome to the N. E.C..

Despite the difficulties of the Conser-

vative Party, t ity too had gone under a period of vigorous
reorganization.

After the ascendancy of Bonar Law as party

leader in 1911, the Conservatives began the effective linking
of competing party bodies, local parties, and the Central
Office. 82

Meanwhile, the Liberals had reorganized their party
without reorienting their members. 8 )
81 John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin (London:
Longman, 1978), p . .5.5-.82 Ibid ., p. 71.

83 It should be mentioned that despite NLF reorganization ,
Cook ' s and Emy's findings claim ethat actual centralization
and cohesion had as yet not taken place other than in parts
of Lancashire.
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The Liberal Party of 1914, unbeknownst to its leaders ,
was not yet ready to face the challenges of the new political
situation of the twentieth century .

The Liberals had under-

gone the requisite ideological and structural growth, but had
as yet not linked this with the actual electoral situation.
This was by no means an insolubl e e problem.

Yet, the lessons

of local elections showed that if the Liberal Party did not
adapt to the changing times, its future was questionable .
The longer the Liberals waited, . the more difficult it would
be to negotiate a mutually benefi cial pact with Labour.

Work -

ing class consciousness would continue to crystallize in the
form of trade unionism (which increasingly meant support for
the Labour Party) .

The Labour Party's organization would

grow stronger and more cohesive.

Thus, a certain momentum

would begin to build that wou ld be increasingly difficult
to check and steer into a progressive alliance.

By 1914,

there was no way to predict the future of Liberalism with
certainty .

CONCLUSION
Historia Vagula
The Lamps are going out allover Europe; we shall
not see them lit again in our lifetime.
(Sir Edward Grey-August 4, 1914 )1
Oh the war! If it would only cease!
(Lord Haldane to his mother, January 7 , 1915)2

World War I contributed to "a process of disintegration
in the Liberal Party which by 1918 had reduced it to ruins.")
The War presented an entirely new set of challenges to Liberalism . 4
By 1915, Asquith had been forced to accept a Coalition Government including the Conservatives and Labour .

Before the war

had ended, the party had been torn assunder into two rival
factions.

Other than the political ramifications , the war

sped up many of the new trends that this paper has identified .
Under the pressures of full mobilization, trade union member ship exploded and working class consciousness was stimulated
exponentially.
)

Thus, to eliminate World War I as a primary

1Dangerfield, p. 424 .
2Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Part~ 1914-35
(Ithaca, H.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 2).
3Ibid.

4See the first three chapters of Wilson.
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contributor to the unnaturally precipitous demise of Liberalism
is indeed foolhardy.
This study ends with August 4, 1914.

To compare ante-

bellum England with its condition in the aftermath of 1918
yields only differences, not similarities.

Thus, to make

some kind of "inevitablist" argument for the death of the
Liberal Party is very difficult.
This paper has attempted to grapple with four major
historiographical questions.
1) What was the position of the Liberal Party by
the outbreak of World War I?
2 ) How does one justify historical demarcations?
(i.e. How and why were three chapters in this paper decided upon?)

3) What kind of change (political or social) can
be achieved through a given political system?

4)

What is the nature of a period of transition
and how does it affect the political system?

Between 188,6 and 1914, England underwent a series of
important social changes which would alter the entire basis
of partisan politics.

The growth of

wor~er

consciousness led

to the polarization of the electoral system.

The Conserva-

tives came to stand for wealth and the Labour Party for the
working man.

The Liberal Party was caught somewhere inbetween .

The Liberals intellectually met the challenge by attempting
to become the party of the working class.
simple task,.

But this was no

The traditional adherents to Liberalism were

not eager to take on such an ideology nor should it be expected that they could in such a short period of time.

Thus ,

the Liberal Party became something of a political potpourri ,
)
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a-t-tempting -to retain its traditional middle-class supporters
while at the same time trying to attract a new working class
constituency.
tension.

This would almost certainly lead to internal

The breakdown o£ Lib-Labism and the results o£ local

elections are the proo£ o£ this problem.
berals were in a critical situation.

By 1914, the Li-

They had not resolved

the internal inconsistencies between policy and rank and £ile
sentiment.

However, World War I inter£ered

de."'1'~

the

Liberals the opportunity o£ resolving this £undamental challenge.

Yet, it must be emphasized that it was not the War

which initiated the Liberal's problems.

As o£ 1914, the Li -

berals were already experiencing serious di££iculties and
decay .
I t is a di££icult yet necessary task to divide history
into sections.

The divisinns this paper has made seem to be

the most help£ul in evaluating the £irst £ourteen years o£
the twentieth century in England.

The most conspicuous £ea-

ture o£ these years was the great social upheaval within the
working class (chapter I ).

This is a political paper and it

has there£ore been necessary to see what the tangible e££ect
o£ social upheaval was on the political system .

Thus, a n

examination o£ the Labour Party was necessary ( chapter II) .
The £inal chapter attempted to describe the actual (both £rom
the "perspective o£ 1914 and with the bene£it o£ 20:20 hindsight) political situation by 1914.

Certain conclusions can

now be made by examining these three chapters as a unit.
Attempting to link the growth o£ working class conscious-
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ness with the growth of the Labour Party is at best problem atic.

However, there are certain relationships between the

two which are important to understand .

The uniqueness of

the working class movement in England was a very important
factor in the shaping of a "Labour Party".

Defined by forces

peculiar to England, the new worker did not consider himself
a Marxist or revolutionary Syndicalist.

While adopting these

movements ' tactics, the worker steadfastly refused to embrace
their creeds and names.
trade unionism.

Instead, the worker took refuge in

This type of practical and traditional action

was of no small importance for the Labour Party.

It was not

accidental that such groups as the S.D.F. and Fabians were
excluded from any control of the party soon after its formation in 1900.

It was also not an accident that Lloyd George ' s

plea for national unity during the Agadir Crisis succeeded .
By July 1914, many people felt that a "General Strike" was
imminent.

Yet, with the outbreak of war, the vast majority

of the working class readily traded in their picket signs for
gr.lns.

The I.L.P. had formed a working class coalition with

the knowledge that it was the vast and as yet untapped force
of conservative trade unionists which would make or break
the fortunes of an independent political Labour Party.

Though

the N.E.C. resisted direct control by the T.U.C., it was the
growing harmony between the two bodies which was the most important feature of the pre-war party.

It was also not a coin-

cidence that the N. E.C . developed" a political organization
that was based on the trade unions.

The most important influ-
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ences on the Labour Party were those that affected trade
unionism (e.g. Taff Vale, Osborne Judgement, and the Trade
Union Act of 1913).
The most pressing demands of the English working class
movement were very concrete and specific.

The Labour Party ' s

programme from 1906 to 1914 was also very narrowly defined.
More idealistic leaders such as Hardie, Hyndman, and Tillett
held little influence in the party by 1914.

There is little

doubt that the great bulk of the labour movement held the
views espoused by trade unionism .

Thus, the Labour Party

only became more radical as the rank a nd file became more
radical.

MacDonald moved the N.E . C. slowly until after the

strikes and political ruptures in the minmng constituencies
of 1911-14 seemed to suggest that the party as a whole was
ready for stronger political action.

Thus, the N.E.C. fi -

nally relented in allowing more three-cornered contests.
The constraints of the political system also bore heavily
on the fortunes of Labour.

The nature of the franchise, the

traditions of political voting habits, a nd the constitutional
crises of the day were all serious obstacles to an unfettered
growth of Labour power .

The pact of 1903 is the best example

of the need for compromise in order to break into a highly
structured system.

It was not easy to overcome as pervasive

a force as Lib-Labism.

Yet, the Labour Party could grow only

as fast as certain traditions were lost.

This naturally leads

to an examination of the position and actions of a highly
confusing and contradictory Liberal Party .
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The Liberal Party had all of the advantages of a well established institution.

Yet, because of the confusion in

aspirations between the leaders and rank and file of the party,
much of this advantage had been lost by 1914.

The decision

by the party to allow Labour to grow virtually without challenge
from 1901 to 1910 must be viewed as a grave and decisive error.

C----., By

letting Labour occupy certain areas, a habit was allowed

.~ to form.

This momentum was translated into organization and

fueled by a heightened working class consciousness.
was by no means a mere interest group by 1914.
treated as such by the Liberal Party.

Labour

Yet it was

The lessons of the

by-elections and local elections between 1910 and 1914 all
revealed the serious repercussions of this foolish and contradictory policy.

A possible 1914 or 1915 General Election

would have to be fought on funaamentally different grounds
for the Liberals not to be swamped because of three-cornered
contests.

Ideological differences were unimportant; even if

they existed.

It is easy to make these observations in 1980.

We can look back at the situation of 1914 free from the diffi culties and myopias of those years.

From the perspective of

1914, it is difficult to imagine the Liberals formulating
new strategies with regard to Labour considering the exigencies
of the era.

But it is only possible to gain a clear view of

the electoral situation of the time by juxtaposing these three
chapters.
J

A much larger and general historical question concerns
the amount of change that can be accomplished through a poli -
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tical system.

The period this paper examines is an excellent

case study for gaining an insight into this question.
The initial force for change comes from outside the poli tical system.

This is the force of rising class conscious-

ness which begins as a very unwieldy, nebulous, and unfocused
impetus.

Immediately, this impetus encounters a series of

filters which begin a process which will narrow the force's
scope.

In the case of workers' consciousness, the initial

filter is embodied in the traditions and customs of Britain
(Chapter I, section ii).

The next step in this process is

the finding of a sNitable outlet in which the now narrowed
consciousness can become visible.

Trade unionism was that

object.
By residing in the union movement, working class conscious ness was Qncumbered by yet a further set of contraints.

These

filters included such things as institutional constraints
(e.g. union

procedu~es)

and the very fact that this force

was working through an established process.

The next filter

is the most critical and most difficult to penetrate.
the actual entrance into the political arena.

It is

That working

class consciousness was able to penetrate the political system reveals the enormous strength and importance of the movement.

Yet, once within the political forum, the initial impe -

tus is even more severely defined.
All of the constraints inherent in the system serve to
prevent any cataclysm (despite the cataclysm the force can and
did exhibit at times) from occurring.

The nature of the
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£ranchise, the two party system, and many other £eatures o£
British politics limit the amount o£ change that can be achieved
through the system.

Once one adds such constraints as the

issues o£ the day ( e . g . constitutional crises),the actions
o£ political actors ( e . g . the actions o£ the Liberals), and
other external obstacles ( Ta££ Vale, Osborne, etc.), the
amount o£ potential £or change is admittedly very small in
a short space o£ time.

By 1914, what remains are certain

trends and patterns o£ disenchantment which reveal themselves
in such ways as rank and £ile unrest
and municipal election results.

( Keighl~,

Leicester )

The di££iculty in Lib-Lab

relations is the most salient o£ these patterns and the most
important £or the period this paper deals with.

Thus, poli-

tical change is tempered by a vast array o£ di££erent £orces
and £ilters.

The entire process (unless interrupted by some-

thing as momentous as the First World War) is a very slow one
and becomes more de£ined by negative obstacles cast in its
path than by the original ambiguous impetus.

That anything

of the original working class consciousness remained and had
pro£ound in£luence on the political system by 1914 attests
to its overwhelming strength and vitality.
It is time to return to the hypothesis originally pro pounded in the Introduction to this . paper.

It is critical

that 1910 to 1914 be understood as a period o£ transition.
The essential quality o£ a period o£ transition-which actually
de£ines it as such a period-is the interaction between the
old and the new.

In order to elucidate this point, it is

1)0
important to examine each chapter and identify these points
of tension.
The crux of chapter I was its emphasis on an entirely
new set of trends which began to permeate and profoundly affect
the working class.

These new forces included the growth of

education, the reduction in the work week, and the new develop ments in communication.

The most important old force was

the working class tradition in England.

Pride in England and

pragmatic vision were the hallmarks of this tradition.
ther important old problem was the economy.
course been periods of inflation before.

Ano -

There had of

That this phenome-

non reoccurred at the same time that these newer forces began
to affect the working class was critical in defining what
types of demands would be formulated by the newly aroused
consciousness of the British worker.
The trade union movement offers another set of compari sons between the old and new.

Trade unionism itself was

certainly not a new force; hence, the "New Unionism".

Be-

tween 1890 and 1914, there was an on-going battle between
the new unions and old unions for supremacy in the T.u.c.5
Inherent in both of these confrontations was a question of
)

issues.

The new unions stressed demands of union recogni-

tion, working only with union men, intra-union association,
political action, and a quest for a minimum wage.

Yet, the

traditional purposes of unionism remained strong.

Safety

5See the Webbs' Histone of British Trade Unionism.
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regulation, prevention of wage cuts, and craft and union
integrity all continued to be important forces up to 1914.
The Labour Party itself was a new entity.

Yet, externally

and internally it too experienced the tension of old and new.
External to the party were such old considerations as the
constraints of the system and traditional political perceptions of the electorate.

Yet, these older questions were

now being challenged in a very significant way by the new
and powerful effect of political unionism and heightened
working class consciousness.

Within the party, the clearest

example of old and new can be seen in the struggles over leadership o£ the N.E.C.

On one side were such veterans as

Hardie and Hyndman seeking control.

On the other, werereac-

tionary Lib-Labers like Bell and Burns.

In the end, a com-

promise was reached with the ascendancy of men such as MacDonald and Henderson to the leadership.

The struggle over

control and coherence (see Chapter II) are examples of how
these tensions were translated to the operational level.
In the Liberal Party, the problemo£ transition was most
acutely felt.

The New Liberal versus the Old Liberal was

the critical con£rontation for the future of the party and
electoral system (as it was then constituteg).

The manner

in which this dichotomy was solved would dictate whether the
party would remain a signi£icant force in politics.

In Chap-

ter III, three problems were identified as trouble spots for
the Liberals.

The dif£iculties in organization were not new.

The struggle between autonomous, fragmented organization and
)
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centralization was an important f'eature of' these years. Centralization was beginning to prevail by 1914.

The problem

of' compositional stress (middle-class against working class )
was also not new .

Yet, in degree, the movement to the lef't

""'~
by Liberalism wasAradically
dif'f'erent than ever bef'ore .

The

leaders and thinkers of' the party had within f'our years l ef't
the basic tenets of' nineteenth century Liberalism smoldering
in thexr grave.
rapid change?

Was the party as a whole ready f'or such a
If' the decay of' Lib-Labism in the constitu-

encies has any signif'icance, it appears not .

The problems

between the Liberal and Labour Parties were of' course not
completely due to the old versus ne.w tensions . mDJ~nmanw , ways,
these problems-especially f'rom the Labour point of' view-were
more practical (e.g. f'ielding working class candidates ).

Yet,

the critical question was whether the Liberal Party, not
merely its elite, had changed?

Given Lib-Lab tensions and

municipal election results, it is apparent that the old against
new tension had not been resolved.
The tensions engendered by a period of' transition do not
all occur in the same way.

Sometimes ihhe old and new will

conf'ront one another ( as within the Liberal Party ).

At other

times, the old and new will interact in such a way as to
sharpen and def'inethe new (e.g. the ef'f'ect of' unionism and
British tradition on a heightened working class consciousness ).
Admittedly, this interpretation yields many ambiguities .
describing the Liberal Party, Dangerf'ield labeled it as an
"Animula Vagula" .

Def'initions are always imprecise.

In a

In

1JJ
period of transition , history is vague :
There are no definitive answers .

Historia Vagula .

In a sense , this entire

paper has attempted to trace several process problems.

Thus,

the period 1910 to 1914 should be considered as a series of
transitional tensions which attempted to work themselves out .
However, after 1914, the political system "was involved in
an encounter with a rampant omnibus (the First World War ),
which mounted the pavement and ran ( it ) over .,, 6
6Wi lson , p . 18 .

APPENDIX A
ECONOMICS
The purpose of this appendix is to examine the economic
condition of the wage-earner in England in the years 1900-14 .
The three measurements that will be examined are nominal wages , real wages, and prices.

Of course these three measure-

ments are dependent upon one another.

But it is most convenient

and helpful to examine them individually.

The major sources

used are A. L. Bowley's Wages and Income in the United Kingdom
Since 1860 , the Board of Trade Labour Gazette, and the most
recent study found in ~e Cambridge Economic History of Europe ,
vol. 7, part I.

Two clarifications should be made before

proceeding wi th the examination.
The question why certain sources are used and others
excluded is important .

Bowley's work is used because almost

all "wage statistics for the pre-1914 years are based "l on his
work.

The Gazette is used for several reasons.

Its statis-

tics were the numbers that the government used in assessing
the economic condition of the country.

The Gazette was pub-

lished every month and thus from an historical standpoint ,
l SidneyPollard, "Labour in Great Britain", The.. Cambridge
Economic History of Europe, vol . VII, part I (London: C.U.P,
1978), p. 165.
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reveals the perceptions of mos t people of the time.

It is

therefore invaluable as a source for a paper on political
perceptions.

Pollard's work is used as it is the most modern,

most eclectic , and presumably most accurate work to date.
The second problem is the difficulty in providing accurate
measurements for the period in question.

Many industries

had no systematic method of reporting wage-changes.
industries are simply missing.

Many

Thus, this study will examine

changes from year to year and compare these changes to previous years.
The index of the nominal wage is tabulated from figures
reported by trade unions and employers, and these only when
they are compiled uniformly and, relate to morethan one date.
The major problem is the question of changing relative numbers. '
This refers to a problem of composition.

Just examining the

general change in the nominal wage is misleading.

The prob-

lem arises from the fact that different industries have more
people than others.
report a 102,17 5

Thus, the Coal Mini ng Industry might

pound :llSi~

in wages a week for 978 ,000 people

compared to the year before.
over

Th ~ s

rise might account for

75% of the complete rise in wages for the entire country. .

This obviously does not help assess how Eggland as a whole
was doing as far as nominal wages were concerned.

Bowley has

devised an equation for this problem taking into account all
of these factors ( See A) .
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Bowley ' s figures for nominal wages are as follows :
1900-130
1901-128
1902-126
1903-125
1904-123
1905-123
1906-126

1907-133
1908-130
1909-129
1910 - 130
1911 - 131
1912 - 135
1913-137
1914-118

1880 was the first year Bowley examined, and he used it as
his base year

(i.e.~100).

rise from 100 to 130.
uneven.

Until 1900, there was a gradual

After 1900, the changes in wages were

1900-05 was a period of decline .

of recovery to the previous wage levels.
of general stagnation .

1905-07 was a period
1908-11 was a period

The year 1912 was fairly prosperous

as compared with 1911 mainly due to the Miners Minimum Wage
Act.

Thus , the general change in wages from 1900-14 was an

uneven rise of 8 po i nts.

The Labour Gazette's appraisal for

1911 can be generalized for the whole period.

There was a

"slight upward movement in wages ... but did not become at
any time very marked."

To clarify this examination of nomi -

nal wages further it is helpful to lc}ok at the wages for specific industries both in Bowley and the Labour Gazette .
Bowley reports the following figures.
Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909

Agricultural
109
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110

Coal ___ Building
115
163
115
153
11
5
142
11
5
138
11
5
134
115
132
11 5
136
11 5
157
115
152
11 5
145

Shi:Qbuilding
109
11 0
110
110
110
110
110
110
110
110 .. ~;'

Cotton

---r2T
124
23
123
124
127
132
n
0

data
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Year
Agricultural
Coal
Building
Shipbuilding
Cotton
1910
110
. ~
115 - 110
no
1911
112
144
115
112
1912
114
152
116
114
data
1913
118
1 63
119
118
1914
122*
160
123*
122~
*NOTE: 1914 is an anomaly because of the impact of the war.
The ; first six months actually revealed a mild depression ~jj
But this was totally negated by the inflation the war caused.
In both Bowley and the Gazette, the numbers (See B) revealed
several trends .

The Coal Mining industry had a very large

effect on the course of the nominal wage.

Most other indus -

tries had relatively stable wages to 1910 and then a rise of
only a few points occurred before the war.

Hence, the course

of the nominal wage was fairly similar to the course of wages
in the coal industry.

The first decade of the twentieth cen-

tury can basically be seen as a struggle to regain the levels
reached in 1900.

1 910-14 can be construed as a period of

modest gains in the average wage as the 1900 level was fi l"lally eclipsed.
The nominal wage alone only reveals that wages were not
impro;ging very much.

It is even more helpful to compare this

figure with the cost of living.

The cost of living (or course

of prices) is tabulated by indexing which requires the technique of weighting.

Bowley established a certainn budget of

expenditures and evaluated its cost year by year.

The items

in this budget included food, rent, fuel, clothing, and sundries.

The

foll~~ing

table is Bowley's account of the course

of the cost of living as compared with wages.

Column 1 was

converted from the nominal wage into similar terms of the
cost of living index to afford some basis of comparison.
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Column 3 is the real wage which is found by dividing Column 1
by Column 2.
Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
12,14

Wages
94
93
91
91
89
89
91
96
94
94
94
95
98
99
100

Cost of Living
91
90
90
91
92
92
93
95
93
94
96
97
100
102
100

Quotient
103
102
101
99
97
97
98
101
101
100
98
97
97
97
100~

The following table is from the Gazet,1e and examines the course
of the retail price of food.

23 articles are indexed and

then weighted .
1900-100
1901-101·9
1902-101.6
1903-103·2
1904-104·3
1905-103·7
1906-103·2

1907-105·8
1908-108.4
1909-108.2
1910-109·9
1911-110
1912-114.5
1913-115
1914-111.6-pre war
121·2-war

More specifically, the retail price of bread rose 16 . 2% from
1900 .

The price of meat rose 21% .

Dairy goods rose about

An ar1'lysis of the preceding data reveals a general steady
rise in the cost of living and the price of food from 1900-14.
At times, these prices rose sharply (food-1911-12).

Other

than the years 1907-09 which saw a depression, the cost of
Ii ving was highslF7:' than the nominal wage .

Real wages fell
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throughout most of' the period and the best they ever did was
to achieve a degree of' stability af'ter 1911.
One f'inal question to ask of' the economic statistics is
what was the wage-earner ' s share in the total G.N.P?

Keynes ,

Bowley, and Pollard were all struck by the stability of' this
relationship.

For over 40 years, the wage-earner who made

up approximately 75-80% of' the population was consistently
earning about 40% of' the G.N. P .
Wages as
Years
Percentage of' GNP

1870-4
1875-9
1880-4
1885-9
1890-4
1895-9
1900-4
1905-9
1910-13

40.741.5
40.0
40.1
41·9
40.7
40·3
38.0
17.3

Wage-earners
as % of' occupied
:Q.opula tion ..

83·7
82·7
81.7
80.8
79·7
78·7
77·5
75·9
74.6

This table shows a declining percentage of' the workf'orce earn ing a consistent percentage of' the G.N:iP. Thus, it would seem
that the wage-earner was actually improving his position .
But this is misleading.

These are aggregative f'igures which

obscure certain distributive anomalies (e.g. skilled and
white collar workers were improving their position) within
the wage sector.

Yet, the most misleading aspect of' this table

is the simple f'act that there was tremendous mnequality evident .
Three-f'ourths of' the workforce was earning only two-f'if'ths of'
the G. N7P(i.e. 25% of' the population earned 60% of' the G.N.P.).
There is a gradual improvement but nothing signif'icant when
one examines each industry .
This study's purpose has been to establish that the period
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1900 to 1914 for the worker , was at best , one of stagnation .
Nominal wages fought throughout the entire period to regain
the levels of 1900.

Meanwhile, prices were fairly consistently

rising throughout the period.

An even more important consi-

deration is not these general macro-economic trends.

In the

study of trade union growth, the three most important groups
which served as catalysts for the growth in the T.U.C . were
the miners, railwaymen, and the unskilled transport workers .
The miners plight is fairly well illustrated in the statistics with

w~ges

not recovering to their 1900 level until 1913 .

The railwaymen and transport workers' numbers are not inclu ded.

Both these groups suffered from severely depressed

wages and conditions.

The effect of rising prices was most

acutely felt in these quarters.

In conclusion, wage stagna-

tion was felt and perceive d by most
of rising prices.

wage~earners

in the face

It is important to note that the fifteen

years before the period in question were marked py rising no minal wages and falling prices.

Thus, the worker of the

early twentieth century was quite unaccustomed to the
nomenon of wages lagging behind prices.

phe ~

This is apparent

from almost all of the literature of the period (see especially Askwith).
J

Fit into a framework of a "more educated

worker with more leisure time to think and read political,
socialist;, and industrial propaganda, some causal relationship can be seen for the subsequent growth of trade unions and
in turn the Labour Party .

In particular, the plight of the

workers in the three major industries of the period was most

severe .

This led to organization and disputes in the period

after 1910.

All of these men (RR, coal, transport) were part

of industries integrally connected with Britain's economy
and their efforts to enhance their positions were directly
felt by the entire country.

Thus, even if the aggregate

totals are not very revealing and make pro j ections tenuous ,
the

~~cific

numbers of these other industries are clearly

bad enough to point to political action and growth .

-r
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statistics in Appendix E. But in 1931 and in 1935 the earlier proportion was restored, owing' to the fact that women suffered less
from unemployment than did men.
The effect of various hypotheses is shown in the following little
table. There it is seen that very little depends for the final index on
these proportions of agriculturists to other males, or of females to
males.
.
Average earnings (in shillings)

:
1,

: .!
-t. :

i,

.

!:

Males
Actual earnings
Industry (Table XI)
Agriculture (p. 113)'
Combined
Proportion 8: 1

: :

II:

<t!ll

"
Adopted
Males
Females (Table XI)
Combined
.
Proportion 7=3
"
Index-numbers
Index on p. 19

.

j
';

:.

.

H

.:::r:

I

72: 28 in 1924

1 906

1924

193 1

1935

27"0
16'7

57"6
28'7

3 1'9

55'7

56'9
32,' )

2 5'9
26'2
2 5'9
2 5'9
II'8

54'4
55'2
54'4
54"4
27'5

53'1
53'7
53'7
53"7
26'9

54"2

21"8

46'3
4 6'9

45"7

100
100
100

981
97
97

54'9

54"7
54'7
27"3
46'5 (0)
- (f,)

100 (a)
99 (6)
95

Thus it is clear that in 1935 the index obtained from actual
earnings reads higher than tl:iat from wage-rates as on p. 30.
This is the justification. for modifying the latter as is there done.
I

The figures of Table XI are reduced 9 per cent. to include boys.

Appendix B
NOTES ON SEPARATION OF THE FACTORS
MAKING FOR CHANGES IN AVERAGE WAGES
The change of average wages of the whole working class over any
period depends partly on the increase or decrease in the rates for a
normal week, partly on the amount of unemployment, short-time
and over-time, partly on changes from time- to piece-rates, and
finally on the shifting of the relative numbers between occupations
within an industry, and tlle shifting from industry to industry.
(Memorandum of the London and Camhridge Economic Service, No. 28,
p. 2. (ref. 42).) Of these factors, total unemployment is allowed for
in computations of the National Wage-Bill in Chapter v. The
changes within each industry are dealt with above in the working
up of the Wage Censuses, where the averages for whole industries
are taken, with a double reckoning for earnings in normal hours
and actual earnings. There remains the factor of the influence of
relative changes of the numbers in the whole industries. The
analysis given in the following pages is based on 'Notes on Index
Numbers', EconomicJournal, 1928, pp. 235-'7 (ref. 25). Here it is
applied to the successive Wage Censuses.

Notation.
Number of persons in each of m industries or occupations:
at first date N , ... Nt '" N,n,
at second date nI ••• nt '" n,,,.
Average wages of these persons:
at first date WI'" Wz ... Wm ,
at second date WI'" W t ••• wm •
Average wage in all industries:
atfirst date W = (W,N, + ... + WzNt + ... + WmNm)
=

-;- (NI + ... + Nt + ... + N m )
SeWN) -;- mN,

where N is the average number in an industry ;
at second date iii = S (wn) -;- mn.

' ,:;; r
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Forward measurement of change in average wages, the relative
numbers in industries being as at first date:
RI = (wINI + ... + wtN, + ... + wmNm )
-:- (WIN, + ... + W,Nt + ... + WmNm)
, = S (wN) -:- S (WN).
Backward measurement of change, the relative numbers being as
at the second date:

R z = S (wn) -:- S (Wn).
Increase of average wage:
where

1= w -:- JP' = Rz x PI

PI = S(JPn) -:- SeWN)
Sen)
SeN)

= RI X P z,

SeWn) and P = Sewn) -:- SewN).
z
mWn
Sen)
SeN)
Then PI or P z measures the chflnge in the average due to the
shifting of numbers, while RI or R z measures that due to changes
of wages.
Write
=

nt

n
= N' Nt + Y" W, = W + {"

Also
PI = S (W,nt)
W. S (nt)
= I

=

_
S {(W + (t) nt} =
WS (n,)

+ S ({tYt) ,

(n

I

S {{t
Nt + Yt)}
+ _--:N=-_ __
WS (nt)

S ('(I Nt) = 0,

since

WS(n,)

;

(il

= I + Mean
.~).
,
W ii
Hence PI> I, if {t and Yt are positively correlated, that is if an
increase in relative numbers is associated with high wages at the
first date.

Similarly P" ,=

I

+ ~i Mean

I;,..~ I,

where

Wt

= W + Vt,

so that S (Vtn,) =0. P z >' I if an increase in relative numbers is
associated with high wages at the second rate.
With the help of these formulae we can obtain rough indications
of the influence of the shifting of numbers on the general average
over several periods.
Mr G. H. Wood l gives the following figures:

R _ R _ Sewn) - RI.S(Wn) _ S{(RI W,+xt)nt} - R .. S(Wtn,)
2.
, SeWn)
SeWn)
S (Xtnt)
= SeWn) =

S {XI

(nN Nt + YI)}

n

Wj

= 0,

Not allowing
for change in
numbers

100

147

lao
131

186

lSI

5

I

= -I x Mean (XI YI)
PI
W n
=:0. -

•

Therefore R z > RI if increase in numbers is correlated with increase of wages in excess of R I •
If Rz = RI there is no net gain or loss by transference to rising or '
falling wages.

.
I,

Taking the second column as I and the third as Rn we have
1850-J880
1880-J910
J850-19JO

S (Wn)

,
S N)
= SS (XtYt)
( TY/ ) , smce(Xt
t

Allowing
for change .in
numbers
18 0
1880
19 10

:

.,

Average money wages

so that x, Y and { measure the variation of w, n or W from their
averages or weighted averages.
Then , S (x,Nt) = 0, S (Yt) = 0, S ((tNt) = 0.
It follows that

,

1'47
1'265
1'86

RI

Pz

1')1
1'15

1'12
1'10
1'23

I'SI

Using the index 100: 130 for I 1880-1910, as on p. 6 above,
we have P z =1'13 for that period. Thus approximately half of the
increase in average earnings is due to movement to higher wages,
half to movement towards rising wages.
I Journal of the Royal Statistical Socie~y, 1909, pp. 102.-], brought to a
later date with the help of ihid. 19I2.-13, p. 2.2.0.

:
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APPENDIX B
Municipal Election Gains as Reported in The Times , 1910-14.
November 2, 1910
I

Labour and Socialists
Accrington-l
Aston-l
Blackburn-l
Bolton-1
Bootle-1
Bradford-l
BurY-1
Cbatham-1
Coventry-1
Croydon-1
Gillingham-2
Huddersfield-l
Leeds-1
Leicester-1
Liverpool-l
Macclesfield-2
Manchester-.5
Northampton-2
Salford-2
Swansea-1
Taunton-l
Thornaby-on-Tees-l
Wakefield-l
W. Ham-2
Wolverhampton-l
Total=34
)

14.5
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November 11, 1911
II

Labour and Socialists
Ashton-Under-Lyne-1
Bath-1
Birkenhead-2
Bolton-1
Bradford....:6
Brighton-1
Carlisle-1
Chatham-l
Crewe -2
Croydon-l
Darwen-l
Gillingham-2
Halifax-l
Huddersfield -2
Ipswich-l
Jarrow-l
Leeds-3
Leigh-2
Liverpool-6
Macclesfield-l
Manchester-2
Portsmouth-1
St. Helens-l
Salford-l
Southampton-2
S. Shields-3
Stockport-l
Taunton-l
Stoke-on-Trent-1
Wa~~fJ.eld=l~ __
Wo:t~erhampton-l

York-2
Total=56

Unionists
Bedford-3
Blackburn-l
Burnley-J
Cheltenham-1
Colchester-1
Coventry-3
Derby-2
Dudley-2
Grantham-2
Grimsby-2
Huddersfield-4
Plymouth-3
Pudsey-l
Ryde-l
Southampton-l
Southend-3
Southport-l
Totnes-l
Stockton-on-Tees-l
Wakefield-l
West Hartlepool-l
Total=37

Liberals
Bath-1
Barnsley-l
Beaumaris-3
Birkenhead-2
Bol ton-l
Bootle-l
Bradford-l
Bury-l
Cardiff-1
Carlisle-l
Chesterfield-2
Denbigh-l
Devonport-4
Durham-1
Kidderminster-1
Leeds-l
Merthyr-2
Middlesborough-2
Northampton-2
Norwich-2
Nottingham-2
Oldham-3
Oxford-1
Rochester-1
Sheffield-5
Stockport-2
Thornaby-on-Tees - 1
Sunderland-1
W. Bromwich-l
Yarmouth-2
York-l
Total=52-

No vember 2, 1912
III
Labour and Socialists
Blackburn-1
Bournemouth-l
Bradford-4
Bristol-1
Croydon-1
Derby-l
Eccles-l
KeighleY-l
Leicester-l
Leeds-l
Leigh-l
Macclesfield-2
Newport-l
Northampton-2
Norwich-l
Portsmouth-l
Shrewsbury-1
Southampton-2
St. Helens-l
York- l
Total=26

Unionists
Liberals
Ashton-under-Lyne-l Bath-l
Barrow-l
Birmingham:-1
B Erlfhrld ...,--Z
Blackburn-l
Birmingham-5
Burton on Trent-l
Bootle-J
Bury-J
Bol ton-2
Coventry-2
Bradford-1
Croydon-2
Bristol-1
Gloucester-2
Burnley-2
Grimsby-l
Carlisile-l
J ETarrow±- l
Crewe-l
Newbury-l
Gillingham-J
Nottingham-l
Halifax-l
Portsmouth-l
Hartlepool-l
Rochester-l
Huddersfi ~L d-2
S. Shields-1
Ipswich- l
Stalybridge-2
Jarrow-l
Sunderland-l
Kiddernminster-:-l
Totnes-l
Leicester-l
Taunton-l
Leeds-4
Wakefield-l
Leigh-l
Warrington-l
Liverpool-2
Total=27
Ludlow-1
Manchester-J
Middlesborough-l
Nelson-l
Nottingham- l
Oldham-l
Oxford-l
Plymouth-2
Preston-l
Richmond-l
Salford-2
Scarborough-1
Sourhainpton-l
Southport-1
W. Ham-J
Wigan-l
Wolverhampton-2
Yarmouth;... 1
Total== 66
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November 4, 191J
IV

Labour and Socialist
Barnsley-1
Barrow-in-Furness-2
Bedford-l
Birkenhead-l
Birmingham-2
Bradford-J
Brighton-1
Bristol-2
Burnley-l
Carlisle-l
Chester-l
Colchester- l
Coventry-l
Croydon-2
Hull-2

Keigh~-l

Leeds-J
Leigh-2
l\'Ierthyr-l
Middlesborough- J
Norwich-2
Rotherham-l
St. Helens- l
Sheffield-2
Southampton-l
S. Shields-l
Stockton-on-Tees - J
Stoke-on-Trent-l
Wakefield-l
'l<1ligan-5
York-l
Total=51

Unionist
Accrington-2
Banbury-2
Blackburn-l
Blackpool-l
Bol ton-l
Bootle"":1
Bournemouth-l
Bury-1
Colne-1
Cardiff-1
Cheltenham-1
Chesterfield-1
Coventry~l

Devonport-1
Dukinfield-1
Gillingham-1
Halifax-2
Huddersfield-1
Keigh:ty-1
Liverpool -2
Newport-1
Northampton-2
Norwich-1
Oldham-J
Portsmouth-1
Pudsey-1
Rochdale-2
Rochester-1
Salford-2
Southport-1
Stalybridge-1
Southampton-1
Taunton-J
Wallsend.;...l
W. Hartlepool-1
Wolverhampton-l
York-4
Total=51

Liberal
Birkenhead-1
Bol ton-l
Bristol-2
BurnleY'- 1
Bury-l
Chester-l
Darlington-1
Dudley-i
Exeter-2
Eye-l
E. Ham-l
Hereford-1
Ipswich-1
King's Lynn-J
Lancaster-1
Manchester-2
Merthyr-l
Nelson-l
Newport-1
Plymouth-2
Pwillhell-l
Shrewsbury-l
Stockton-onTees-2
Swansea-l
Wakefield-2
Total=Jl
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